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I. INTRODUCTION
R ACE equality, sex equality, a climate in which different cultures can
cooperate and coexist - these are the elusive ideals of a pluralist
society. The struggle to realize them, or to create conditions under which
we can know whether or not they are realizable, lies at the heart of such a
society; it is its constant preoccupation.
The same egalitarian pluralist ideals are rallying cries for opposing
sides of many controversies. They are invoked to condemn and to sup-
port color-conscious affirmative action, they can require a woman's right
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I am indebted to Marj Benson,
Ruth Colker, Rob Grant, Allan Hutchinson, Marlee Kline, Patrick Macklem and Martha Minow
for their many helpful suggestions and their warm encouragement. I have included authors' first and
last names in my footnotes so as to make their respective genders more easily ascertainable.
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to choose or a fetus' right to life, and they ground claims for the same
treatment or special treatment where the questions 'who is the same' and
'what is special' are also contested. Gender difference and culture (or
race) difference are the subject of countless disputes which lead to deeply
troubling questions about how much of a difference difference makes.
This Article seeks to contribute to these debates by arguing for a
different approach to issues of cultural diversity, one which takes its in-
spiration from recent developments in American and Canadian feminist
theory. The context for the discussion is Canada and some current dilem-
mas posed by the cultural diversity of its population. By moving out of
the messy and familiar problems of difference in the United States into
the problems faced by a country that shares similar ideals but in a differ-
ent place with a different history, my intent is to give American readers a
glimpse of the unfamiliar but recognizable, an opportunity to consider
gender and culture in a terrain where the positions do not seem so well-
entrenched and the arguments so well-trodden.
Part I of the Article approaches cultural difference by describing its
rhetoric and illustrating it with a sketch of cultural diversity in Canada,
past and present. Drawing upon the terminology defined in Part I, Part
II describes recent developments in feminist thought as an example of a
cultural struggle within a cross-cultural group and identifies in those de-
velopments approaches to assist in rethinking problems of cultural diver-
sity. Part III seeks to synthesize Parts I and II by considering how the
approaches in Part II could be useful in addressing current Canadian
cultural problems; it aims to encourage the reader to assess the suffi-
ciency of descriptions of cultural diversity (including that in Part I) in
1. Although Canadian jurisprudence is replete with American citations, the converse has not
been true. However, Canada and Canadian constitutional law appear to be of increasing interest to
American legal scholars. For some examples, see Drew Dais, Civil Rights in Canada: An American
Perspective, 32 AM. J. CoMP. L. 307 (1984); David Fraser & Alan Freeman, What's Hockey Got To
Do With It Anyway? Comparative Canadian-American Perspectives on Constitutional Law and Rights,
36 BUFFALO L. REV. 259 (1987); Mary Ann Glendon, A Beau Mentir Qui Vient de Loin: The 1988
Canadian Abortion Decision in Comparative Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 569 (1989); Catharine
MacKinnon, Making Sex Equality Real, in RIGHTING THE BALANCE: CANADA'S NEW EQUALITY
RIGHTs 37 (1986); Martha Minow, Putting Up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered
(presented as the Orr Emett Lecture, Osgoode Hall Law School, April 15, 1989); Alan Borovoy,
Barry Brown, Jamie Cameron, David Goldberger, Kathleen Mahoney & Mari Matsuda, The James
McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Language as Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and Ameri-
can Perspectives on Group Defamation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 337 (1989).
This is due, at least in part, to Canada's proclamation of a constitutional bill of rights in 1982
which is both strikingly similar to and quite different from the American Bill of Rights. As Canadian
constitutional jurisprudence evolves on issues of concern to all pluralist societies, and as our econo-
mies become increasingly interdependent, it is likely that this dialogue will continue.
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light of this discussion and to affirm the potential of feminist theoretical
developments in contexts other than gender.
The Article assumes that cultural diversity is something worth
nourishing. Several justifications for this assumption can be advanced:
cultural diversity gives content to concepts such as equality and tolerance
which we see as valuable; it provides ways to explore alternative visions
of the good life, both collective and individual; and it is an essential
means by which to acknowledge the subjective agency of others. But the
most powerful, and simplest, justification for cultural diversity is the
stubborn persistence of cultures. People throughout history have fought
successfully to preserve their cultures against all odds, in the face of the
most unyielding oppression. The tenacity of ethnicity suggests that our
cultures are inseparable from us, that any vision of the future that is
meant for us must respect our cultural identities. Seen this way, fostering
cultural diversity is necessary to allow people to be who they are.2
II. LESSON ONE: LOCATING-TERMINOLOGY AND CONTEXT
A. Naming Difference
One of these things is not like the others,
One of these things is not the same.
Can you guess which one is not like the others?
That is how we play the game.3
The ability to recognize difference is learned. People from non-Eng-
lish linguistic backgrounds frequently cannot recognize the 'difference'
between British and American English. Caucasians have claimed that 'all
Blacks' or 'all Orientals' look 'the same'. While such comments often
reflect racist attitudes, they also reflect a failure of perception; if my ears
or eyes are not sensitive, I cannot perceive the world that is apparent to
others. In an important sense, I am deaf or blind.
The way we recognize difference is through language. If I know that
something or someone has a name, I am more likely to perceive4 distinc-
tiveness; the name has led me to expect that the something or someone is
2. Fostering cultural diversity as a consequence of human identity does not entail accepting as
inevitable the relevance of physiological (or racial) differences between groups of people. For exam-
ple, Marge Piercy presents a vision of a utopian society peopled with white-skinned Blacks, black-
skinned Chinese, and blonde Wamponaug Indians in WOMAN ON THE EDGE OF TIME (1976).
3. Sesame Street song. This is one of Martha Minow's favorite ways to introduce the concept of
difference.
4. I use "perceive" rather than "see" or "hear" to include all the senses since people differ with
respect to what senses they rely upon as their primary means of perception.
1990]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
distinguishable and that the distinction is significant. Learning names en-
ables me to think difference; speaking names enables me to make differ-
ence. The act of naming people is especially potent because it constructs
the way they are perceived; it delineates and underscores differences be-
tween those named and all others, it suppresses differences between those
named. The named tend to become their names.' Definition, therefore, is
"an expression of power";6 it shapes our reality. It is not surprising, then,
that names for groups of people are controversial. Who does the naming
is as controversial as the name itself, and who uses it.
7
My position as author confers some power upon me to name, but it
does not grant objectivity; the decisions I make about what names and
what definitions I employ are a reflection of my perceptions (which them-
selves are shaped by my socialization, by my enculturation and accultur-
ation) of the problems I discuss. In writing about cultural diversity, I use
two kinds of names: first, names for groups of people I want to discuss
and second, definitions or names for concepts that describe the relation-
ships within and between these groups.
It is important for me as the writer and you as the reader to be
conscious of the names I use and what they connote. One way to start to
do this is to consider the choices of names available. Here is a very par-
tial list of some of the names for groups of people in Canada:'
5. This is not to suggest that any individual may, simply by an act of will, create a difference
between others. Calling something or someone a certain name results from the operation of both
volitional and non-volitional factors. The point is only that each time a name is spoken, for whatever
reason, a difference is reinforced.
For a fictional development of themes related to the power of naming, see URSULA LE GUIN,
EARTHSEA TRILOGY: A WIZARD OF EARTHSEA (1968), THE TOMBS OF ATUAN (1971) and THE
FARTHEST SHORE (1972). bell hooks writes about the importance of naming for author identity -
for herself and for constructions of her image by readers in to gloria, who is she: on using a pseudo-
nym, in TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK 160-66 (1989).
6. J. Edward Chamberlin, Aboriginal Rights and the Meech Lake Accord, in COMPETING CON-
STITUTIONAL VISIONS: THE MEECH LAKE ACCORD 11, 12-13 (1988) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL
VISIONS].
7. For example, "Negro," "nigger," "Black," "Afro-American" and "African-American" are
all names for roughly the same group of people. The differences each name articulates are different:
some emphasize racial difference, others carry connotations of ancestry, ethnicity or citizenship, and
also of class and ability. The meaning conveyed by the name varies with the speaker, her context,
and her relationship to the named: "nigger" means something different written in BELOVED than it
does when shouted by a Ku Klux Klan leader - or when that event is reported in a Supreme Court
judgment. TONI MORRISON, BELOVED (1987); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
8. I have already exercised some choice in presenting these names in four columns which
roughly correspond to the four broad groups that are identified in academic literature and in popular
consciousness as descriptive of the composition of the Canadian population. I have not listed "eco-
nomic" names, such as "domestic worker," "laundryman," "lawyer," "farmer" and so on which




























































Each of these names is different from the others. Each is an incomplete
description in that it emphasizes only some portion of what might distin-
guish the named group from the (unstated) reference group. Being con-
scious of the use of names involves at least thinking about the meaning of
the name in the particular context - who is included and who is not,
what is the unstated reference group, and the normative message the
name carries. 9
Many terms are used to describe the relationships between a soci-
ety's various cultural groups. Some, which have entered popular con-
sciousness through the rhetorical efforts of politicians, are overtly
controversial and offensive to some people."0 Others, whose usage is
largely confined to social science and other professional discourses, ap-
selves and which they call others, those in current usage and those with historical significance, names
which are socially acceptable and those which are not.
9. It is also important to remember that giving a group a single name does not make it a homo-
geneous group for all purposes, it only constructs a similarity for some purposes. Further, the groups
are not mutually exclusive: a statement that the four broad cultural groups in Canada are the Eng-
lish, the French, the aboriginal people and the immigrants should not be taken to mean that each
Canadian belongs to only one group, flattening or even suppressing the existence of Haitians
(French-speaking immigrants), persons of mixed parentage, and so on.
10. Canadian examples include "the Canadian mosaic," "binationalism," "multiculturalism"
and tortured combinations of these, such as "multituralism within a bilingual framework" and "bi-
lingualism within a multicultural context." Robert Harney 'So Great A Heritage As Ours' Immigra-
























pear less inflammatory but there is little consensus about their mean-
ings. " Many terms have both pejorative, popular meanings and neutral,
scientific meanings which adds to the confusion.2 The best I can do is to
explain the principal terms I intend to use and indicate what I mean
when I use them. 13
Culture: Some anthropologists use culture synonymously with
ethnoculture, which is "the total configuration of patterned and institu-
tionalized ideas, beliefs, values, standards, skills, and behaviors that char-
acterize the distinctive world view, ancestral heritage, or tradition and
life ways of a particular ethnic group"; it is a learned phenomenon, with
geographical and historical dimensions.1 4 Sometimes culture is distin-
guished from social structure: "culture ... represents a shared symbolic
blueprint which guides action on an ideal course and gives life meaning.
In contrast, social structure signifies the constraints on individual action
arising from the connections and dependencies in all organized systems."
Culture and social structure are interdependent: cultural assimilation
(sharing the beliefs, norms and values of the dominant group) follows
inevitably from structural assimilation (participating in the dominant
group's organizations and institutions)."
When I use culture, I mean it in its broadest sense, including its
more personal, psychological or symbolic aspects and its more institu-
tional or structural aspects. A culture which has both symbolic and
structural components is often referred to as a nation 6 and I will use this
term as well.
Equality and Discrimination, in JUSTICE BEYOND ORWELL 267, 278-79 (1985). A notorious Ameri-
can example is "the melting pot."
Each of these terms offends some groups. For example, the First Nations reject all terms that
imply that Canada is based on two societies or nations, neither of which is aboriginal; they also reject
multiculturalism on the basis that it reduces them to the status of an immigrant group.
11. Examples include "culture," "ethnicity," and "nationalism."
12. For example, "racism," "multiculturalism," and "minority."
13. The terms overlap: "culture," "ethnicity" and "pluralism" share a greater degree of similar-
ity with each other; "ethnocentrism," "discrimination" and "race and racism" form another loose
grouping; "minority" and "multiculturalism" are related (in different ways) to the two groups and to
each other.
This definitional section is lengthy. A central theme of this Article is the importance of names;
appreciating their complexity, whether they apply to people or to concepts about people, is an inte-
gral component of this.
14. EVELYN KALLEN, ETHNICITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CANADA 13 (1982).
15. Lance Roberts & Rodney Clifton, Exploring the Ideology of Canadian Multiculuralism, 8
CANADIAN PUB. POL'Y 88, 88-89 (1982).
16. For Kymlicka, "nation" is synonymous with "culture" which is narrowly defined as "a
historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or home-
land, sharing a distinct language and history." Immigrant groups in Canada do not have cultures in
[Vol. 38
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Ethnicity: When culture is defined broadly as ethnoculture, these
two terms are virtually synonymous. Ethnicity, or ethnic identity, how-
ever, is the more scientific term. The concept is temporally and spatially
complex: ethnocultures become fragmented and new ones form over
time, and the multiethnic state is the global norm.17 It is also ubiquitous
and particular in that everyone has his or her own ethnicity.18 Ethnic
identity is a function of shared actual or assumed characteristics; it is an
arbitrary or constructed classification of human populations based on the
biogeographical criterion of common ancestry and such sociocultural cri-
teria as language, nationality or religion. 9 Ethnicity includes physical
traits, institutions, behaviors, socioeconomic positions, shared values,
outlooks and a sense of community.2' It is a function of the perceptions
of both members and non-members of a culture as to what the members
have in common.21
Ethnicity is usefully subdivided into symbolic ethnicity and struc-
tural ethnicity. Symbolic ethnicity is said to be voluntary, and comprises
part of an individual's sense of identity. It is "[a] nostalgic allegiance to
the culture of the immigrant generation... ; a love for and pride in a
tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday
this sense of the term. Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Ethnicity, and the Law 2 (presented at the Legal
Theory Workshop, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, October 14, 1988).
According to my usuage, the Qu6b~cois and most aboriginal communities are nations, whereas
most immigrant groups constitute cultures.
17. See KALLEN, supra note 14; Roberts & Clifton, supra note 15; ROBERT KAUFMAN, RIGHTS,
NEEDS, AND GROUPS: TOWARDS A RECONSTRUCTION OF PHILOSOPHIC, JURISPRUDENTIAL, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS (1983).
18. Raj Anand, Ethnic Equality, in EQUALITY RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 81, 84 (1985).
19. KALLEN, supra note 14, at 59-63; see also id. at 79-104.
20. KAUFMAN, supra note 17, at 81.
21. KALLEN, supra note 14, at 61; Leo Driedger, Conformity vm Pluralism: Minority Identities
and Inequalities, in MINORITIES AND THE CANADIAN STATE 157 (1985). Kaufman states that
ethnicity must be perceived as "a matter of degree, involving involuntary, physical or inherited
traits, and voluntary, cognitive processes of self-image and identity, involving not only how individu-
als act or see themselves, but also the perceptions of outsiders. Social consensus in turn appears to
help define the attitudes of outsiders, and to shape the self-image of group members themselves, 'who
come to see themselves as others see them', subjective and objective ascriptions forming a complex
interaction process." Kaufman, supra note 17, at 86.
Ethnicity does not include class, although one's class is often closely related to one's ethnicity.
Similarly, ethnicity does not usually include physical disability or sexual preference, although strong
arguments have been made for recognizing these groups as possessing distinct cultures. See e.g.,
CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, DEAF IN AMERICA: VOICES FROM A CULTURE (1989). Afri-




behavior."' 22 Structural ethnicity is not considered voluntary or individ-
ual. It concerns the ability of a group to "perpetuate itself, control leak-
age, resist assimilation and propagate its beliefs."' 23 The individual/group
distinction between symbolic and structural ethnicity is important, but I
find the voluntary/involuntary distinction inapposite. The felt allegiance
to the culture one is born into is not merely a matter of choice; it is part
of the constituted, not the choosing self.24 The extent to which you nur-
ture this aspect of your identity may be chosen, but its presence is not.
The acquisition and preservation of ethnicity is as complicated as its
definition. Enculturation is the process of acquiring the ethnic identity of
the group you are born into whereas acculturation is integrating into an-
other culture.25 Ethnicity is maintained through both positive and nega-
tive conditions. Territory, institutions (religious, educational and social
welfare), culture (endogamy, language, friends, membership in ethnic in-
stitutions and schools), historical symbols (knowledge of origins and
pride in heritage), ideology, and leadership are some positive conditions.
Negative factors include social distance, stereotypes, prejudice and dis-
crimination.26 Structural ethnicity is much harder to preserve than sym-
bolic ethnicity in a pluralist society.
The aspects of ethnicity that I wish to stress are its pervasiveness
and particularity: that the ethnic identity of a person or group differs as
between outsiders and insiders; that it changes over time; and that it has
chosen and constitutive, personal and structural, positive and negative
characteristics.
Pluralism: By pluralism or, more accurately, cultural pluralism, I
intend to describe a society which contains more than one culture or
ethnic group, each of which retains some of its distinctiveness and some
autonomy, but which coexists with other cultures in a more or less stable
22. Roberts & Clifton, supra note 15, at 90, quoting Gans, Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of
Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America, 2 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 1 (1979). See also Joseph
Magnet, Interpreting Multiculturalism, in MULTICULTURALISM AND THE CHARTER: A LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE 145, 148 (1987) [hereinafter MULTICULTURALISM].
23. Magnet, supra note 22, at 148.
24. The "constituted self" is Michael Sandel's term. See SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIM-
ITS OF JUSTICE (1982). The distinction between the choosing and constitutive aspects of the self is
one of the foundations of the communitarian critique of liberalism. See also ALASDAIR MCINTYRE,
AFrER VIRTUE (1981); Donna Greschner, Feminist Concerns with the New Communitarians: We
Don't Need Another Hero, in LAW AND THE COMMUNITY: THE END OF INDIVIDUALISM? 119
(1989).
25. KALLEN, supra note 14, at 147.
26. Driedger, supra note 21, at 159-62. This is one of many lists of factors in the preservation of
ethnicity. See also Kallen, supra note 14, at 156-69; Magnet, supra note 22; Roberts & Clifton, supra
note 15, at 89.
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way.27 A picture of cultural pluralism revolves around three axes. First,
pluralism in a society may be relatively voluntary (where the group as-
serts its distinctive ethnicity) or involuntary (where the majority segre-
gates the ethnic minority). Second, a society may be relatively pluralist
(maintaining distinctive ethnic groups with little interaction between
them) or assimilationist (tending towards cultural homogeneity).28
Third, it may be more multinational (the state contains more than one
nation, usually due to conquest or the creation of a federation among
nations) or more polyethnic (where ethnic groups, usually immigrant
groups, retain the more symbolic aspects of their various cultures and
accept, voluntarily or involuntarily, the institutional structures of the
state).29 Cultural pluralism is far from static; the kind of pluralism best
suited to the ethnic groups within a given territory and the kind of plu-
ralism to strive toward varies with ethnicity, ideology, region and time.
Someone who seeks to understand what cultural pluralism is, or should
be, must begin by studying these four factors.
Ethnocentrism: Ethnocentrism is "the ubiquitous tendency to view
all peoples and cultures of the world from the central vantage point of
one's own particular ethnic group and, consequently, to evaluate and
rank all outsiders in terms of one's own particular cultural standards and
values."'30 Ethnocentrism is unavoidable: no one can fail to have a per-
spective, and the more different (from you) someone or some group is,
the lower they tend to be ranked. 3' Ethnocentrism has a positive and a
negative face: enlightened ethnocentrism is advancing the self-interest of
your group with due respect for the rights and interests of others; and
pernicious ethnocentrism is advancing the self-interest of your group at
the expense of the rights and interests of others.32 Ethnocentrism is what
draws people together, making ethnic identities and cultural pluralism
possible. Ethnocentrism is also what diminishes people by calling them
outsiders, making discrimination and racism possible. Martin Buber's
distinctions between "peoplehood," "nationality" and "nationalism"
span the ethnocentric spectrum: peoplehood is the product of common
27. Ramcharan states: "Cultural pluralism refers to the presence in the society of more than one
language, religion, kinship pattern, or normative value system." SUBHAS RAMCHARAN, RACISM:
NONWHITES IN CANADA 83 (1982). See also Kaufman, supra note 17, at 75.
28. Driedger, supra note 21, at 157-58, 164-70.
29. Kymlicka, supra note 16, at 1-3.
30. KALLEN, supra note 14, at 25.
31. Id. at 25-26.




experience, of a "unity of fate"; nationality is collective awareness of pe-
oplehood; and nationalism is excessive consciousness of peoplehood
which occurs in the face of oppression or division. "Peoplehood is an
impulse, nationality an idea, nationalism a program."33 Advocates of cul-
tural pluralism believe that ethnocentrism is inevitable but pernicious
ethnocentrism is not; nationality need not mean nationalism; and group
identity grounded in enlightened ethnocentrism can permit the coexis-
tence of many cultural groups on their own (ethnocentric) terms.
Discrimination: Discrimination is "a direct attack upon the self-im-
age and self-development of those individuals who identify with a
group."34 It takes four basic forms: individual, institutional, structural or
systemic, and cultural. The first two are more direct forms of discrimina-
tion, attributable to prejudiced attitudes which rely heavily on stereo-
typed differences between ethnocultures. Individual discrimination refers
to a prejudiced actor; institutional discrimination describes someone who
acts in conformity with the dictates of a prejudiced group. The latter two
forms are more indirect (in the sense that they are harder to combat;
however, the discrimination may be directly experienced by victims).
Systemic discrimination permeates the structures of social institutions.
Cultural discrimination, a closely related phenomenon, is produced by a
dominant culture's imposition of its ethnocentric values on a pluralist
society through law and public policy which has the effect of denying
equality to other ethnic groups.35 All of these forms of discrimination or
racism exist in Canada and appreciating how they function is critical to
an understanding of Canadian cultural pluralism.
Race and racism: The term race itself has a racist past. Its most
common usage refers to ethnocultural distinctiveness and not to biologi-
cal difference.36 Because race historically has been a label which imputes
deep physiological differences, such as levels of intelligence or ability, on
the basis of such superficial physical differences as skin color and facial
features, and because I believe the most salient aspects of difference for
33. See Michael Walzer's essay on Buber in WALZER, THE COMPANY OF CRITICS 64-66 (1988).
34. Magnet, supra note 22, at 149-50.
35. Anand, supra note 18, at 85; Joan Ryan & Bernard Ominayak, The Cultural Effects of
Judicial Bias, in EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY 353 (1987).
36. David Hughes, Introduction to E. KALLEN, supra note 14, at 4-12.
Race and racism are difficult words to define and to use because of their highly charged emotive
and political connotations. For example, Raj Anand implies that race and racism refer to perceptions
of primarily biological differences when he suggests that it is "inappropriate" to refer to comments
directed at language groups or "culturally-based minorities" as racist - although he subsequently
notes that race has both biological and cultural components. Anand, supra note 18, at 82-83.
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the purposes of this paper are contained in the concepts of ethnicity and
culture, I will avoid using this term.
Racism is "a set of beliefs, policies and/or practices predicated on
the erroneous assumption that some human populations are innately su-
perior to others"; it is not only practiced by whites, "it is endemic to
humankind."37 Pernicious ethnocentrism, prejudice, stereotypes, social
distance and discrimination are key components of racism.3" Racism is
often used interchangeably with discrimination. I use racism in a more
condemnatory way than discrimination because of its stronger emotional
impact; I consider racism to be pernicious ethnocentrism practiced by
those in power and discrimination to be pernicious ethnocentrism prac-
ticed by the less powerful.
Minority: Minorities are "social categories whose members occupy a
subordinate political, economic and/or social status in the society rela-
tive to the dominant status of corresponding, majority categories. The
concept focuses on power disparities .... ,,3 A minority is a group on the
margins of power." A minority group may be a minority in some con-
texts and a majority in others.41 Members of a minority group may be in
a minority or a majority within the context of that group (compare Ital-
ian lesbians with Italian businessmen) and an individual may be in a mi-
nority in some respects and in a majority in others (as a woman of Color
I am in a minority, as a lawyer I am not). The calculus of minorities is
complex; it is important to resist the tendency to ascribe minority status
to the whole person or group, neglecting the ways the group or its mem-
bers (or some of them) possess power relative to others.
A distinction is often drawn between voluntary and involuntary mi-
norities. Voluntary minorities refer to those who leave a homeland for
another country, integrating in the new environment to some extent
while preserving aspects of their culture, whereas involuntary minorities
are those who, because of territorial conquest or political boundary ad-
justments, become a minority within a political jurisdiction.42 Involun-
37. KALLEN, supra note 14, at 22.
38. Id. at 25. See also AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 45, 124 (1984).
39. Evelyn Kallen, The Meech Lake Accord: Entrenching a Pecking Order of Minority Rights 14
CANADIAN PUB. POL'Y (Special Supp.) S107, n.1 (1988).
40. BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984) (defines being in the
margin as being "part of the whole but outside the main body").
41. For example, French Canadians are a minority in Canada and a majority in Quebec. Their
simultaneous minority/majority status distinguishes French Canadians from other groups who are
mostly always majorities or mostly always minorities. White women within the North American
feminist movement are in a similar position. See infra text accompanying notes 198-205.
42. This distinction roughly corresponds to Kymlicka's distinction between national and ethnic
1990]
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tary minorities are usually considered to have stronger collective rights
claims than voluntary minorities.43
Multiculturalism: This controversial term is used frequently in Can-
ada: there is a Canadian Multiculturalism Act,' a federal multicultural-
ism directorate,45 and the word multicultural appears in the
Constitution.46 It has a long history; the First Nations have pointed out
that it predates European arrival.4' What multiculturalism means in
Canada today has been both disparaged48 and praised.49 Some have ar-
gued that it refers only to symbolic ethnicity, and there is disagreement
among them as to whether it should remain that way.5" It has been as-
serted to conflict with and to be harmonious with dualism or binational-
minorities which derives from his analysis of multinationality and polyethnicity as the two sources of
cultural pluralism. Kymlicka, supra note 16, at 1-4. Again, it is important to be wary of voluntary/
involuntary distinctions. When I consider the plight of refugees whose arrival in Canada is a
"choice" in only the most formal sense, I find it hard to draw a firm line between "voluntary" and
"involuntary."
A more useful distinction might be based on the size of the minority group: immigrants tend to
arrive as individuals or in family groups, other minorities tend to arrive in larger groups, with insti-
tutional and social structures relatively intact.
43. KALLEN, supra note 14, at 129; see also id. at 57-78.
44. 35-36-37 Eliz. II; Can. Stat. 1988, Ch. 31.
45. Harney, supra note 10, at 2.
46. CAN. CONST. § 27 [hereinafter the Charter] states: "This Charter shall be interpreted in a
manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of
Canadians."
47. "[P]re-contact North America was, by its very socio-geographic nature, a multi-cultural
society.... It was not necessary then, and it is not necessary now, that Aboriginal people in Canada
all think the same way about the same things.... Europeans did not invent multiculturalism. It was
here when they got here - even if it did take them five hundred years or so to recognize its validity
and entrench it in their legal and political processes." Smokey Bruyere, What Do Native People
Want in the Canadian Constitution? (Presentation of the Native Council of Canada to the Special
Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the 1987 Constitutional Accord, May
26, 1987).
48. "[Multi-culturalism turns out to be a choice of pizzas, won-ton soup, and Kosher 'style'
pastrami sandwiches to which one can add ethnic radio programs." Howard Brotz, Multiculturalsm
in Canada: A Model, 6 CANADIAN PUB. POL'Y 41, 44 (1980). Ramcharan argues that the version of
multiculturalism currently espoused in Canada not only fails to meet its goals but positively hurts
nonwhite immigrants. RAMCHARAN, supra note 27, at 85. Kymlicka rejects the term entirely, argu-
ing that it blurs the difference between multinationality and polyethnicity, thereby hopelessly confus-
ing multicultural policy. Kymlicka, supra note 16, at 3.
49. See, e.g., THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON BILINGUALISM AND BICULTURAL-
ISM, BOOK IV: THE CULTURAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS 4-5 (1969).
50. Magnet, supra note 22, at 148. For Roberts and Clifton this is what multiculturalism should
mean. Roberts & Clifton, supra note 15, at 90-92. Ramcharan disagrees, arguing that protecting
symbolic ethnicity alone disguises and perpetuates entrenched racism in Canadian society. In order
to combat racism, multicultural policies that lead to institutional change are required. Rameharan,
supra note 27, at 85-107.
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ism.5 ' Some have argued that it is a private matter and that immigrants
should be free to retain their cultures if they so choose as long as it is not
at the taxpayers' expense." Others (including the federal government)
have seen it as a matter of public concern. 3 There is widespread criti-
cism of current multicultural policies and no consensus about what
should be done or even whether or not they can be improved. 4
As an ideal, multiculturalism has been said to require a conception
of equality that reflects and respects diversity and difference in adminis-
trative policy.55 It is often linked with words like tolerance, accommoda-
tion and equality. For many, it means redressing the vertical mosaic. 6
When I use multiculturalism, I do not mean to restrict it to any particu-
lar set of ethnic groups or to any aspect of ethnicity. I do not intend it
either as an ideal or as an answer. Rather, it represents the whole set of
questions about what and how cultures and ethnic groups (ethnicity)
should be recognized by the state, questions about language, education,
the structure of public institutions, the allocation of resources and polit-
ical offices and so on.
5 7
B. Canada
The collective Canadian quest for a distinctively Canadian identity
has permeated both academic literature and popular consciousness. 8
51. Michel Lebel argues that it is inconsistent with dualism, in particular, with the cultural
survival of Quebec. Lebel, Quelques reflexions autour de P'article 27 de la Charte canadienne des
droits," in MULTICULTURALISM, supra note 22, at 139-140. Harney and Tarnopolsky consider mul-
ticulturalism different from but congruent with French/English biculturalism. Harney, supra note
10, at 51; Tarnopolsky, supra note 10.
52. Lebel, supra note 51, at 143.
53. Whether it is even possible to distinguish between public and private is contentious. For
example, Carol Weisbrod has argued that a public/private distinction is incoherent in the context of
religious diversity. Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Reli-
gious Authority, 26 J. FAM. L. 741 (1987-88).
54. See Anand, supra note 18, at 81; Brotz, supra note 48 at 41; Driedger, supra note 21; Kallen,
supra note 14; Harney supra note 10, at 51; Lebel, supra note 51, at 139-140; Magnet, supra note 22,
at 148; F.L. Morton, Group Rights Versus Individual Rights in the Charter: The Special Cases of
Natives and the Qudbdcois, in MINORITIES AND THE CANADIAN STATE, supra note 21, at 71;
RAMCHARAN, supra note 27; Roberts & Clifton, supra note 15.
55. Daniel Hill, Equality and Minorities, in JUSTICE BEYOND ORWELL, supra note 10, at 290.
56. The term was coined by John Porter to describe the vertical stratification of ethnic groups in
Canadian institutions and society: English and French Canadians, and British and Western Euro-
pean immigrants at the top, followed by later immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, with
aboriginal peoples at the bottom. See JOHN PORTER, THE VERTICAL MOSAIC (1965). Others have
expanded the hierarchy to include nonwhite immigrants and Blacks at the lower end.
57. See Kymlicka, supra note 16, at 4 (describing this as the "politicization of ethnicity").
58. The Fall 1988 issue of DAEDALUS, entitled In Search of Canada is a recent example. In his
preface to the volume, Stephen Graubard pleads for international recognition of a Canadian identity:
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Having been born in India to Indian parents, my earliest consciousness of
'Canadian-ness' was as a status I had only partially achieved. My whole
family wanted to be Canadian and my brother and I would sometimes
exploit this by attempting to persuade my parents that it was Canadian
to have Pop-Tarts for breakfast and to watch TV with dinner. As I grew
older, my aspirations toward and consciousness of a Canadian identity
faded. It only resurfaced when I left the country. In England or the
United States, being Canadian (and not another kind of American) re-
quires an active assertion and advocacy of difference. But each time I
return, Canada slips away from me, just as I suspect it eludes others who
have tried to coin a national identity for this country. Lacking something
to oppose Canada to, small badges of distinctiveness like safer cities,
cleaner air, and more land lose their meaning.59
So what is Canada, anyway? It spreads north for 2,800 miles from
its border with the United States and spans 3,800 miles from Atlantic to
Pacific, making it the second largest country in the world. Twenty-six
million people inhabit this territory, the vast majority of whom live in
cities strung across its southern quarter." As F. Kenneth Hare said, "We
are spread absurdly thin."'" The sheer immensity of the country coupled
with its tiny population clusters has posed a constant obstacle to national
identity. The 19th century struggles to unite the land through the con-
struction of a national railroad6 2 are mirrored in the continuing isolation
"The most significant contribution that this issue of Daedalus can make, written as it is by Canadi-
ans for an international audience, is to explore Canada's distinctiveness, explaining why and how
even it is changing, challenging a good number of the common stereotypes. Canada deserves to be
known for itself, a perpetual comparison with its powerful (and sometimes difficult) neighbor to the
south is not always productive. France and the United Kingdom, both members of the European
Economic Community, do not realize themselves simply by demonstrating or insisting that they are
not like Germany, Italy, or Spain. Why, then, should Canada be denied a comparable identity?"
Graubard, Preface to In Search of Canada, 117(4) DAEDALUS xi (1988).
Another example of Canadian preoccupation with self-description is found in books like A DAY
IN THE LIFE OF CANADA: PHOTOGRAPHED BY ONE HUNDRED OF THE WORLD'S LEADING
PHOTOJOURNALISTS ON JUNE 8, 1984 (1984), which attempt to capture the essence of Canada in
various imaginative ways for middle class living rooms nationwide.
59. The old quip that what holds Canada together is that all Canadians hate Ontario, Ontarians
hate Toronto, and Torontonians hate Bay Street is a wry reminder of our negative sense of identity.
60. Canada's three largest cities, Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver together account for almost
one third of the population. STATISTICS CANADA, CANADA YEAR BOOK 1988 at 2-3 (1987).
61. F. Kenneth Hare, Canada: The Land, 117(4) DAEDALUS 31 (1988). Canada has a popula-
tion density of six persons per square mile; the U.S.S.R.'s population density is thirty three per
square mile; the U.S. has sixty eight per square mile. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS
1990, 696, 761, 766 (Mark Hoffman ed., 1989).
62. For a history of the railroads, see PIERRE BERTON, THE NATIONAL DREAM: THE GREAT
RAILWAY, 1781-1881 (1971) and THE LAST SPIKE: THE GREAT RAILWAY, 1881-1885 (1971).
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of Northern communities.
Canadians in different parts of the country often do not share a com-
mon landscape, climate, or economy.63 They live in different times.' The
population, itself, is also as varied as the land; one of five Canadians is an
immigrant or a child of immigrants who arrived after World War II,65
and there are upwards of 1,265,000 aboriginal peoples.6 6 Approximately
64 percent of the population consider English to be their mother tongue,
26 percent regard French as theirs, 14 percent have another first lan-
guage, and linguistic diversity is increasing.67 Because these various
groups are not spread evenly across the country, inhabitants of different
regions may differ not only in their landscape, climate and economy, but
also in their languages, religions and cultures.6" Although French and
English are the two official languages and bilingual means French and
English in many regions, the reality of bilingualism in the Northwest
Territories is Inuktitut and English;69 in Yorkton, Saskatchewan it is
63. "The regionally divided Canadian economy is typified by the predominance of wheat on the
prairies; lumber in British Columbia; fisheries in British Columbia, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia;
oil and gas in Alberta; potash in Saskatchewan; nickel in Ontario; asbestos in Quebec; and by the
concentration of manufacturing in Ontario and Quebec. Each region has a distinctive character re-
lated to its distinctive products and to the relevance of provincial constitutional jurisdiction to those
economic activities. The regional economic differences have been sharpened by perceptions of re-
gional economic inequality." Ronald L. Watts, The American Constitution in Comparative Perspec-
tive: A Comparison of Federalism in the United States and Canada, in THE CONSTITUTION AND
AMERICAN LIFE 109, 119-20 (David Thelen ed., 1988).
64. Canada covers five and one half time zones. And, in a more figurative sense, the Hutterite,
the Inuit artisan, the Bay Street lawyer, and the P~quiste politician live in different times.
65. Graubard, supra note 58, at ix.
66. Smokey Bruyere estimates that there are roughly 400,000 status Indians, at least 800,000
non-status Indians, and approximately 65,000 Inuit people. The author does not provide an estimate
of the number of Metis. Bruyere, supra note 47. But see Ryan & Ominayak, supra note 35 (stating
that there are about 850,000 native peoples in Canada).
67. The greatest increase is in Asian and Middle Eastern languages. CANADA YEAR BOOK
1988, supra note 60, at 2-5, 2-6. Mother tongue is the first language learned and still understood.
Figures exceed 100 percent since the census permitted individuals to indicate more than one mother
tongue.
68. Quebec is perhaps the most well-known example of Canada's regional cultural diversity, but
the four Atlantic provinces, particularly Newfoundland, have their own very distinctive cultural
traditions. Newfoundland did not join Confederation until 1949 and even then it was over vociferous
protests that Newfoundland culture would perish. William Kilbourn, The Peaceable Kingdom Still,
117(4) DAEDALUS 1, 13 (1988); see also Barry Cooper, The West: A Political Minority, in MINORI-
TIES IN THE CANADIAN STATE, supra note 21, at 203 (arguing that the West has a distinctive iden-
tity and lacks any common vision with the other regions of Canada).
69. And this, too, is an oversimplification: While the whole population of the Northwest Terri-
tories is about 52,000 or 0.2 percent of the population of Canada, within this area the aboriginal
peoples constitute a clear majority. They are not a homogeneous group, however, but consist of four
distinct peoples: the Dene, Metis, Inuit and Inuvialuit. The Dene themselves, who have only recently
identified themselves as a single people, are a minority in the Northwest Territories but, together
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Ukrainian and English; and in Vancouver, British Columbia it is increas-
ingly Cantonese and English.
Against the richly diverse backgrounds of its citizens and their intri-
cate web of ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional allegiances, Canada's
few symbols of unity appear woefully recent; the national flag was
adopted in 1965, the national anthem in the 1970s and the Constitution
was patriated from Britain in 1982.70 Canada is a loose society of alle-
giance to a remote monarch."v Political, legal, and institutional acknowl-
edgment of its multidimensional diversity, which is perhaps the only
distinctively Canadian feature of the country, is extremely difficult pre-
cisely because our differences always seem to be on the point of over-
whelming our unformed, even halfhearted, aspirations toward a national
identity.
What I would like to do is draw a detailed historico-legal picture of
cultural pluralism in Canada, integrating the evolution of multicultural
and immigration policies with that of constitutional, human rights and
anti-discrimination law, as well as with changing levels of racism in the
criminal justice system and in society generally. It is with an appreciation
of at least the broad outlines of such a picture that anyone who wants to
understand, articulate, or resolve conflicts between or within cultures in
a country must begin. The sketch which follows is not comprehensive;7 2
it aims only to evoke the particularity of the Canadian context in order to
ground the problems discussed in the final portion of this Article.
Before Confederation, Ontario and Quebec were part of New France
which was ceded to the British after their victory on the Plains of Abra-
ham in 1759. The area was separated, roughly according to French and
English settlement patterns, into Upper (English) and Lower (French)
with the Metis, form a majority of the population of the western Northwest Territories, a land mass
that is several times larger than England or France. See CANADA YEAR BOOK 1988, supra note 60,
at 2-14; Frances Abele, Dene-Government Relations: The Development of A New Political Minority, in
MINORITIES AND THE CANADIAN STATE, supra note 21, at 239.
70. Kilbourn, supra note 68, at 9.
71. W.L. Morton described Canada as a society of allegiance in contrast to the United States,
which he characterized as a "society of compact," one which is based to a much greater degree upon
a Rousseauian general will. See John Conway, An "Adapted Organic Tradition", 117(4) DAEDALUS
381, 387 (1988), quoting W.L. MORTON, THE CANADIAN IDENTITY 86 (1961).
72. I have drawn upon the following general sources in preparing this sketch: EQUALITY
RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, supra note 18; THOMAS BER-
GER, FRAGILE FREEDOMS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISSENT IN CANADA (1981); In Search of Can-
ada, 117(4) DAEDALUS (1988); PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, (2d ed. 1985);
MULTICULTURALISM AND THE CHARTER supra note 22; WALTER TARNOLPOLSKY, DISCRIMINA-
TION AND THE LAW IN CANADA (1982); RAMCHARAN, supra note 27; CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS: COMMENTARY (W. Tarnopolsky & G. Beaudoin, eds. 1982).
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Canada. Because of conflicts between local governments and the British,
and the perceived threat of French nationalism, the British fused the two
Canadas into a single province in 1840. Slavery was legal in Canada, as it
was in all British colonies until 1883. Although records of Black slaves in
Canada date back to the 16th century, slavery was never an important
component of the country's economy. The Europeans dealt with the ab-
original peoples by treaty from the 17th century onwards; the process
was formalized by Royal Proclamation in 1763.
Confederation offered a solution to the unstable union of French
and English in the province of Canada. It also promised the economic
advantages of a common market, greater military strength against the
United States,73 and a central pool of national funds to help in opening
up the West. For the French, Confederation provided a vehicle for gain-
ing the autonomy necessary to protect their culture. The result was the
British North America Act of 1867, 74 dividing Canada into Ontario
(English) and Quebec (French) and uniting them with Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick into one Dominion." The Act became the new country's
constitution. Confederation marked the beginning of Canadian national
consciousness, but even at its inception the vision was exclusive; Canada
was for Europeans only, aboriginal peoples were shut out.
The Constitution was primarily concerned with the creation of a
federal state, with a parliamentary system of government, and with the
division of powers between the federal and provincial levels. of govern-
ment. The division of powers itself created three opportunities for dis-
tinctive treatment of cultural groups. First, because the French
Canadians constituted a majority in Quebec, the powers granted to the
provinces gave the French Qu6b6cois some measure of cultural auton-
omy. Second, the paternalistic allocation of specific groups to an exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction 'protected' them from local interference.76
"Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" were 'given' to the federal
73. This was the time of the American Civil War; the Union was hostile to Canada.
74. (U.K.), R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, No. 5; renamed the Constitution Act, 1867 by the Consti-
tution Act, 1982, § 53(2).
75. The Act provided for the addition of other provinces: British Columbia joined Confedera-
tion in 1871, Prince Edward Island in 1873, and Newfoundland in 1949. The huge tract of land that
is now Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, the Northwest and the Yukon Territories was admitted as
a federal territory (that is, entirely under federal jurisdiction) in 1870. The provinces and territories
were created by federal statutes: Manitoba in 1870; the Yukon and Northwest Territories in 1898;
and Alberta and Manitoba in 1905. Id.
76. Although the "protection" was often illusory. For example, the creation of federal enclaves
within the provinces has hurt rather than helped Indians, by subjecting them on a daily basis to the
inevitable conflicts of dual jurisdictions and exacerbating interracial tensions in local communities.
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government, in part, to insulate aboriginal peoples from local settlers
whose interests conflicted more directly with the Indians. The power was
comprehensive, removing aboriginal peoples from the scope of virtually
all provincial law in areas in which the federal government legislated spe-
cial rules for those it defined as Indians." Jurisdiction over "Naturaliza-
tion and Aliens" was also conferred upon the federal7" government
which gave it control over immigration policy and consequently over the
treatment of visible minorities, who were often ineligible for citizenship.
Third, the allocation of legislative powers shaped the evolution of cul-
tural pluralism in Canada. The federal government gained jurisdiction
over marriage and divorce and criminal law, which included matters of
public morality and religion,79 thus assuring nationally uniform cultural
norms in those areas. The provinces gained control over the solemniza-
tion of marriage, property and civil rights, the administration of justice
(including policing), all matters of a "merely local or private Nature,"
and education, thereby creating room for regional diversity in those
areas.
The Act contained only two express group rights: section 93 re-
stricted provincial jurisdiction over education by guaranteeing all reli-
gious educational institutions the rights and powers they had held at the
time of Confederation,8" thus protecting the Catholic and Protestant mi-
norities in each province.81 Section 133 contained the single language
The permanent alien status of nonwhite immigrants who were ineligible for citizenship underscored
their second class status and symbolically sanctioned discriminatory treatment.
77. Constitution Act, 1867 § 91(24). The Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. 1-5, is a comprehensive
code governing many aspects of the lives of status Indians. It deals with such matters as the alloca-
tion and use of reserve land, band governments and band membership, taxation, allocation of gov-
ernment benefits, family law and succession law. "Indians" in § 91(24) was held not to include the
Inuit. See Re Eskimos [1939] S.C.R. 104.
78. Constitution Act, 1867, § 91(25). See also Constitution Act, 1867, § 95, which confers on
both levels of government jurisdiction over immigration into the provinces, subject to a federal para-
mountcy proviso.
79. See Robertson v. Rosetanni [1963] S.C.R. 651 (Canada) (upholding the federal Lord's Day
Act despite finding it had a religious purpose). The statute has since been struck down under the
Charter. See R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Canada).
80. See Ottawa Roman Catholic Separate School Trustees v. Mackell [1917] A.C. 62 (Can.);
Tiny Roman Catholic Separate School Trustees v. The King [1928] A.C. 363 (Can.); Reference Re
Bill 30, Re: an Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont.) [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 (Can.); see also Eric
Apps, Minority Language Education Rights, 43(2) U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 45 (1985).
81. Section 93 applies only to the four Confederation provinces and to British Columbia and
Prince Edward Island. Slightly different versions of § 93 were enacted in the Manitoba Act, 1870, 33
Vict., ch. 3, § 22 (Canada); the Alberta Act, 4-5 Edw. VII, ch. 3, § 17 (1905) (Canada); the Sas-
katchewan Act, 4-5 Edw. VII, ch. 42, § 17 (1905); and by Term 17 of the Terms of Union of New-
foundland with Canada (confirmed by the Newfoundland Act, 12-13 Geo. VI, ch. 22 (U.K.)).
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right in the 1867 Act, providing that English and French could be used
in the federal and Quebec legislatures; that the laws of those governments
must be written in both languages; and that either language could be
used in federal and Quebec courts.82
Between the time of Confederation and the 1982 Constitution, cul-
tural pluralism took its Canadian shape, etched in the histories of its
cultural groups and in the evolution of its legal doctrines. In the initial
post-Confederation years, Francophones in Quebec were a conquered
people, economically and politically oppressed by a wealthy Anglophone
minority. Their history is one of ascendence to power. In the process,
their numbers grew from sixty thousand to six million due to an aston-
ishingly high birth rate,8" which later plummeted to the lowest in the
country (and one of the lowest in the world). As the formidable Catholic
church lost much of its power in secular matters (and many active adher-
ents), the Qu6b6cois turned to politics and the nationalist movement was
forged. After the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, the Qu6b6cois ousted
'Westmount', endured the FLQ crisis and civil rights violations of 1970,
and elected the Parti Qu6b6cois, the first nationalist government in Que-
bec, in 1976. The movement culminated in the Separation Referendum of
1980 which riveted the nation's attention as residents of Quebec voted on
and rejected a proposal to separate from Canada.84
From the moment of unilateral federal assumption of jurisdiction
over them in 1867, the First Nations have struggled ceaselessly against
coercive assimilation and poverty. The Indian Act and the reserve system
were originally created as temporary measures in a larger plan for com-
plete assimilation (and cultural eradication) of all aboriginal peoples.
Before World War II, assimilation was widely regarded by whites as the
only imaginable way of accommodating the Indians. Classical liberalism
82. A similar provision was contained in § 23 of the Manitoba Act; supra note 81. The require-
ments with respect to enactment of statutes and regulations in both languages was not followed in
Quebec (which enacted statutes in French only) and Manitoba (which enacted statutes in English
only) resulting in litigation which challenged the constitutional validity of all of those provinces'
laws. See A.G. Que. v. Blaikie [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016 (Can.), and A.G. Que. v. Blaikie (No. 2) [1981]
S.C.R. 312 (Can.); A.G. Manitoba v. Forest [1979] 2. S.C.R. 1032 (Can.), Bilodeau v. A.G. Man.
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 449 (Can.), and Reference re Lanauage Rights Under § 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870
and § 133 of Constitution Act, 1867 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721.
83. The population doubled roughly every twenty years. The phenomenon was known as "a
revanche des berceaux" (the revenge of the cradles), a reference to the defeat of the French by the
British on the Plains of Abraham.
84. The defeat of the separation proposal did not resolve Quebec's uneasy relationship with the
other Canadian jurisdictions. In fact, a recent poll revealed that 27 percent of English Canadians and
36 percent of French Canadians would prefer that Quebec left Canada. Toronto Globe and Mail,
July 31,-1989, at A7, col. 1.
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and Social Darwinism played no small part in this thinking. After the
War, the plight of the First Nations drew international condemnation,
but it was not until 1960 that the federal vote was unconditionally ex-
tended to aboriginal peoples." Only in 1969, after one last government
proposal recommending repeal of the Indian Act and abolition of the
reserves resulted in massive Indian protests, were federal assimilation ef-
forts finally abandoned.
In the late 19th century, Chinese, Japanese and East Indian minori-
ties lived on the west coast,86 building a national railway and taming the
land. The white population's hostile reaction to the influx of Asian work-
ers was evidenced by race riots in 1907 and the enactment of highly re-
strictive, overtly racist immigration laws. Before World War II,
discrimination against visible minorities by the state was legal in Canada
and was expressly condoned by the Supreme Court.87 During and imme-
diately after the War, people of Japanese descent, including people born
in Canada, were interned in relocation centers and ordered deported to
Japan.8 8 The government's anti-semitism during this period is also well
documented.89 East Indians, furthermore, were ineligible for citizenship
until 1947. Although international criticism of Canada's racist immigra-
tion policies9" led to revised immigration laws in the 1960s, covert at-
tempts to restrict nonwhite immigration on the neutral ground of
reducing racial tensions continued.91 These attempts finally ended with
85. Prior to that time, a status Indian could vote only at the price of giving up status, which
meant losing all of the benefits conferred in the Indian Act, including the right to live on a reserve.
Indians could become "enfranchised" unintentionally through a variety of statutory devices. Thus
"enfranchisement" was an assimilation technique resisted by Indians in Canada at a time when an
effective right to vote was actively sought by Blacks in the U.S.
86. Although many Chinese workers moved inland with the railway and small numbers settled
in many prairie towns.
87. See infra, note 93; Christie v. The York Corporation [1940] S.C.R. 139 (a Black man refused
service and verbally abused in a tavern was held to have no action for damages and humiliation on
the basis of "freedom of commerce".)
88. The federal government's order was appealed to the Privy Council, which upheld the provi-
sion. Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians v. A.G. Can., I D.L.R. 577, A.C. 87 (1947).
The order was never enforced, but during the appeal process thousands of Japanese Canadians left
the country.
For a poignant fictional account of the treatment of Japanese Canadians during this period, see
Joy KOGAWA, OBASAN (1981).
89. See IRVING ABELLA & HAROLD TROPER, NONE IS Too MANY: CANADA AND THE JEWS
OF EUROPE 1933-1948 (1982).
90. In 1947, Prime Minister MacKenzie King publicly declared that Canada was "for whites
only".
91. See e.g., ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, LIFE TOGETHER (1977); W. PITMAN,
REPORT ON RACE RELATIONS IN METROPOLITAN TORONTO (1978); PORTER, supra note 56. See
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the enactment of the Immigration Act, 1976.
Multiculturalism policy had its origin in Canada in a 1969 federal
report which, for the first time, recognized the possibility of cultural pro-
tection for groups other than the French and aboriginal peoples. A mul-
ticulturalism directorate was established in 1973 which funded visible
and superficial multicultural activities. Ethnic groups protested against
the federal policy, claiming that it reduced them to cartoon images of
cultures and lumped them into a homogeneous mass. However, the rhet-
oric of multiculturalism was here to stay.
The evolution of legal doctrines to safeguard cultural diversity was
slow and uneven. The exhaustive division of legislative powers between
the two levels of government provided an opportunity for courts to ame-
liorate cultural and structural discrimination by declaring racist legisla-
tion outside the jurisdiction of the enacting level of government. On one
occasion, a provincial statute prohibiting the employment of Chinese per-
sons in mines was struck down on the basis that it intruded into federal
jurisdiction over "Aliens."92 However, this was the exception in a long
line of cases where similar arguments were rejected and openly discrimi-
natory laws upheld.93
The "implied bill of rights" doctrine was a later attempt to infuse
protection for certain minorities into the inhospitable text of the Consti-
tution. The doctrine directed judges to construe the Constitution as re-
moving some matters from the jurisdiction of either level of government
despite the seemingly exhaustive allocation of powers in the text.
Although it generated important dicta in cases involving restrictions on
speech,94 it was never accepted by a majority of the Court.
95
also ABELLA & TROPER, supra note 89 (tracing Canada's history of anti-semitism, which is roughly
analogous to its treatment of nonwhites).
In the period from 1946-1976, Canada's nonwhite population increased from roughly 50,000 to
over 500,000.
92. Union Colliery v. Bryden [1899] A.C. 58. The court characterized the legislation as "in pith
and substance" relating to "Aliens," a head of power falling within federal jurisdiction rather than a
regulation relating to employment, an area of provincial jurisdiction, which enabled it to declare the
law invalid as ultra vires the government of British Columbia.
93. See, ag., Brooks-Bidlake & Whittall Ltd. v. A.G. B.C. [1923] A.C. 450 (upholding provin-
cial statute prohibiting employment of Chinese or Japanese labor cutting timber on provincial land);
Cunningham v. Tomey Homma [1903] A.C. 151 (upholding denial of provincial vote to Japanese,
including persons born in Canada); Quong Wing v. The King [1914] 49 S.C.R. 440 (upholding
statute prohibiting Chinese employers from hiring women); A.G. B.C. v. A.G. Can. (Japanese Em-
ployment) [1924] A.C. 203 (upholding provincial law prohibiting the employment of Japanese in
mines); Walter v. A.G. Alta. [1969] S.C.R. 383 (upholding law prohibiting communal land-holding
despite clear interference with Hutterite religion).
94. See Re Alberta Statutes [1938] S.C.R. 100 (striking down a provincial law requiring newspa-
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In the aftermath of World War II, human rights became a matter of
widespread concern; international human rights documents were
adopted and domestic human rights codes and statutory bills of rights
enacted.96 The Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960 occupies an anomalous
position in this history. Although section 2 of the Bill provided that
"every law of Canada shall.. .be so construed and applied as not to abro-
gate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgement or
infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein," the courts virtually
never applied it to curtail, much less invalidate, any federal law. 7
This was the background against which the constitutional bill of
rights that would become the Charter was proposed. Although the pic-
ture of a bill of rights that was foremost in popular imagination was that
of an entrenched set of individual rights (no doubt influenced by the
American Bill of Rights), and certainly this was the vision of its principal
architect, Pierre Trudeau, cultural groups and cultural protections
played an important role in the constitutional process; the ethnic groups
were simply too powerful to be ignored. The Parti Qu6b~cois was in
power, the First Nations had received international support for their goal
pers to afford government a right of reply to criticisms of provincial policies); Switzman v. Elbling
[1957] S.C.R. 285 (striking down a provincial law prohibiting use of a house to propagate commu-
nism). See also Saumur v. City of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 299 (1953) (striking down a municipal law aimed
at Jehovah's Witnesses, prohibiting dissemination of literature in public without police permission.)
95. But see the reasons of Beetz J. in OPSEU v. A.G. Ontario, 2 S.C.R. 2 (1987) which may
signal a resurgence of the doctrine.
96. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations in 1948;
Canada became a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1976.
The first comprehensive domestic legislation was the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights of 1947, S.S.
1947, ch. 35. Various piecemeal protections in different provincial statutes followed. In 1962, Onta-
rio enacted the comprehensive Ontario Human Rights Code, S.O. 1961-62, ch. 93, which was admin-
istered by the Ontario Human Rights Commission. The other provinces followed this model over the
next fifteen years; the federal government was the last to act with the Canadian Human Rights Act,
S.C. (1976-77), ch. 33.
97. The primary exception was R. v. Drybones [1970] S.C.R. 282, where a section of the Indian
Act making it an offense for an Indian to be intoxicated off a reserve was struck down. The potential
conflict between the then-prevailing conception of "equality-as-sameness" and the Indian Act
(which overtly provided for differential treatment of a particular group) caused alarm in the commu-
nity of First Nations. Their fears were alleviated as the Court refused to apply the Bill to invalidate
other Indian Act provisions in three subsequent cases, rejecting equality arguments and acknowledg-
ing the special "constitutional position" of Indians. See A.G. Can. v. Lavell [1974] S.C.R. 1349;
A.G. Can. v. Canard, I S.C.R. 170 (1976); Davey v. Isaac, 2 S.C.R. 897 (1977). More recently, a
reverse onus provision in a criminal statute was read down under the Bill: R. v. Shelley, 2 S.C.R. 196
(1981).
It is ironic that the Bill of Rights, which was potentially an important source of anti-discrimina-
tion protection for cultural minorities, was drained of all vitality at the same time that immigration
was liberalized and multicultural policy developed.
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of distinct cultural survival in the Lovelace case,98 and many immigrant
groups had been politicized through their struggles with multicultural
policy. All of these groups voiced their perspectives before and during
the drafting of the Charter. Quebec tried to block it entirely, suspecting
(in the best of Canadian federalist traditions) that anything that re-
stricted the powers of the provinces would somehow inure to the benefit
of the national government.9 9 After losing its legal case against patriation
without its consent,"° Quebec refused to sign the new Constitution.
The text of the Charter did not merely remove from both levels of
government the power to curtail certain individual rights, it fundamen-
tally altered the nature of cultural pluralism in Canada by replacing the
meager protections in the old Constitution with a tangled profusion of
provisions. Briefly, the Charter rights may be divided into pure individ-
ual rights, 101 individual rights with a group protection component (rights
which can only be effectively exercised in the context of a group and so
may imply protection for the group), °2 group rights,10 3 and interpretive
provisions protective of groups."° The latter three provide the basis for
98. Lovelace v. Canada, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex XVIII; U.N. Doc. A/36/40
(198 1). See generally, NEW BRUNSWICK HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, SELECTED DOCUMENTS IN
THE MATTER OF LOVELACE VERSUS CANADA PURSUANT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1981).
99. In any event, it was politically impossible for the Parti Qu6b~ois to agree to any constitu-
tional reform since its goal was to take Quebec out of Confederation.
100. A.G. Que. v. A.G. Can. (The Quebec Veto Reference), 2 S.C.R. 793 (1982).
101. The right to vote (§ 3), the legal rights (§§ 7-14), and the individual right component of the
equality right (§ 15(1)).
102. These are the fundamental freedoms in § 2 (freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of
expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association) and the protections for affirm-
ative action programs in §§ 6(4) and 15(2).
103. The French and English language rights (§§ 16-22); the "minority" language education
rights (§ 23 - "minority" refers here only to the French or English language minority in a province;
the right is to education in the minority language "where numbers warrant"); § 29, preserving the
religious education provisions of § 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867; § 35, which for the first time
recognizes and affirms treaty and aboriginal rights of Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples; and §§ 35.1
and 37, providing for limited aboriginal participation in constitutional conferences.
A group right in a different sense, the override provision in § 33 allows governments to enact
legislation "notwithstanding" §§ 2 and 7-15 of the Charter. The provision was exercised by Quebec
to exempt virtually all of its existing legislation from the Charter as part of its ongoing rejection of
the document as a threat to its cultural autonomy. An Act Respecting the Constitution Act, Bill 62,
S.Q. 1982, ch. 21. Quebec also specifically exercised the override in each statute it enacted after the
Charter came into force. Both Quebec's insertion of a standard override clause in each of its statutes
and the omnibus provision in Bill 62 were upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ford v.
Quebec (A.G.) 2 S.C.R. 712 (1988). The fact that the "overridable" rights are overwhelmingly the
individual rights underscores the primacy of protection of group rights, at least in the text of the
Charter.
104. The interpretation provisions color the way that the Charter is to be read: § 25 requires the
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much greater protection of cultural pluralism, for structural as well as
symbolic ethnicity. Over the next decade, as the courts begin to manipu-
late these provisions in concrete contexts, the acid will bite again, the
pluralism etching will take new shape and the institutional framework of
our ethnocentrism will emerge.
III. LESSON Two: LEARNINc-FEMINIST EXPERIENCE
The obvious question is, what has feminism got to do with cultural
diversity? It is true that the group of people with whom feminists' °5 are
concerned cover the range of ethnic diversity; everyone has a gender and
a culture. 106 But the fact that feminists have developed theories of differ-
ence based upon gender difference does not alone demonstrate the rele-
vance of those theories to problems of cultural difference. In fact, many
white feminists have failed to consider the ethnic diversity of women in
their writings and recently have been taken to task for this by certain
feminists'0 7 who have argued that such writings do not speak for
them.108 The minority critique" 9 has been particularly pointed, because
Charter to be construed so as not to "abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights
or freedoms that pertain to th aboriginal peoples of Canadians"; § 26 provides that the Charter is
not to be construed to deny any other existing rights and freedoms, which presumably would include
those held by groups; § 27 requires the Charter to be interpreted consistently with "the preservation
and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canada"; § 28 guarantees Charter rights equally to
men and women. W. Pentney, The Rights of The Aboriginal Peoples of Canada and the Constitution
Act, 1982; Part I- The Interpretive Prism of Section 25, 22 U.B.C. L. REV. 21 (1988). The Supreme
Court of Canada has yet to address the effect of these sections in a cultural controversy.
105. I am referring primarily to Canadian and American feminists with whose work I am most
familiar. I do not aspire to generalize beyond this relatively narrow field.
106. Moreover, oppression of women on the basis of their gender is present in every society:
"The secondary status of woman in society is one of the true universals, a pan-cultural fact. Yet
within that universal fact, the specific cultural conceptions and symbolizations of woman are ex-
traordinarily diverse and even mutually contradictory." Sherry Ortner, Is Female to Male as Nature
Is to Culture?", in WOMAN, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 67 (1974); see also Michelle Rosaldo, Woman,
Culture, and Society: A Theoretical Overview, in id. at 17; Joan Bamberger, The Myth of Matriarchy:
Why Men Rule in Primitive Society, in id. at 263, 265.
Indeed, some feminists have argued that gender is a function of culture, that gender is constructed
differently in different cultures so that there are not two but many genders. ELIZABETH SPELMAN,
INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); SUZANNE KEss-
LER & WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL APPROACH (1978).
107. "Feminist" itself is a controversial name. The women who have engaged in these critiques
are primarily women of Color, some of whom do not call themselves feminists precisely because they
feel feminism does not speak to their experiences: HOOKS, supra note 40, at 10. 1 use the term never-
theless because it is the only name I know that includes the whole body of work I am discussing.
When I say "feminist", I mean to refer to women of different ethnicities and classes. When I intend
to describe a subset of this group, I will be explicit.
108. Women of Color have led these critiques; important contributions have also been made by
white feminists. See generally, Regina Austin, Sapphire Boundl (1989] 3 Wis. L. REV. 539; BELL
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feminists have criticized men and male-dominated society for ignoring
the distinctive experiences of women, and feminists have claimed to cele-
brate difference in the form of gender. Thus, the recognition that femi-
nists themselves have silenced and submerged the experiences of those
they seek to help has been painful and humbling for white feminists.
More importantly, it has shown cultural diversity to be a feminist issue,
suggesting that feminist theories, developed to respond to its internal cul-
tural critique, are theories which can be applied to issues of cultural di-
versity beyond the feminist movement. The challenge is one of colossal
proportions. It calls for searching scrutiny of the myriad of ways in
which we all oppress each other, it raises doubts about whether there
exists such a thing as cross-cultural feminist or gender identity, and
about whether anybody can say anything about anybody at all. Feminists
have begun thinking and writing about these difficult questions.
Canada is faced (and has been faced) with an analogous set of hard
questions. Canadian preoccupation with identity, the search for some in-
clusive way of speaking about the country, the undercurrent of despair
over the failure to solve group struggles to the satisfaction of all con-
cerned, 10 is a state of collective consciousness similar to that which has
obtained within the feminist collectivity after the minority critique. As
feminists wonder, so too do Canadians: can anything at all be said about
.gender, about Cdnada? Is there any thread of commonality there? Can
the movement, the nation go on or is splintering and fracturing
inevitable?
Unlike feminism, there has never really been a time in Canada's his-
tory where there was a clear and uncontroversial single voice as there
appeared, for a time, to be a single feminist perspective.1"1 As mentioned
HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981); hooks, supra note 5; hooks,
supra note 40; Lorde, supra note 38; Barbara Omolade, Black Women, Black Men and Tawana
Brawley: The Shared Condition, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 11 (1989); Marlee Kline, Race Racism,
and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115 (1989); Martha Minow, The Supreme
Court 1986 Term; Foreward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987); SPELMAN, supra
note 107; and the anthology, ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT
SOME OF Us ARE BRAVE (Gloria Hull, Patricia Bell Scott & Barbara Smith eds., 1982), especially at
5-22.
My discussion of feminism draws upon the work of both feminists of Color and white feminists.
109. "Minority" because feminists of Color are at the margins of feminism.
110. I am thinking here of the struggles of the First Nations for self-determination, the continu-
ally volatile linguistic and cultural controversy between Anglophones and Francophones, the preva-
lence of racism and the politicization of visible minorities and their demands for protection in
response to it, and, most recently, the debacle of Meech Lake as a particular focus for all of these
rifts. See infra text accompanying notes 180-84.
11. Widespread realization that "feminism" has been the feminism of primarily white, middle-
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earlier, the French/English duality was present and widely acknowl-
edged from Confederation onwards. This duality has also meant that
Canada has consistently recognized the necessity for and promotion of
group rights as well as individual rights. Group rights provide an impor-
tant safeguard against an excessive emphasis on individualism, which can
be a strategy by which the dominant group maintains its dominance."1 2
These aspects of Canada, its analogous concern with questions of identity
and diversity, its familiarity with unassimilable and nonsegregable differ-
ence and its commitment to group rights, make it an interesting context
in which to explore feminist responses to its minority critique -,7 and
should encourage those interested in cultural pluralism to study feminist
theory.
I want to focus on three loose distinctions or (non-chronological)
orderings in feminist thought which I visualize as follows:
locating difference




what to do; how to go on)
learning difference
(feminist critique of existing,
white female-dominated feminism)
My starting point in this discussion, as I have tried to indicate by
my picture, is arbitrary; you can start in any one of the three areas, each
will lead you around the circle but, of course, how you perceive each one
will be influenced by where you have been before.
class women of European and Christian origin and not a cross-cultural, universal feminism is rela-
tively recent, although ideological divisions between liberal, socialist and radical feminists have been
recognized for some time.
112. If only individuals have rights and not groups, power is so dispersed that no significant




This area of feminist work is concerned with understanding and un-
covering the phenomenon of gender difference which feminists have ex-
perienced themselves and have noticed in the lives of other women." 3
Some feminists have searched for the essence of gender difference by
looking for the ways in which women and men really do differ from each
other. 114 For example, Carol Gilligan addresses differences in the devel-
opment and processes of moral reasoning in girls and boys, women and
men.115 She criticizes male psychological theorists for failing to consider
the experiences of women in developing their theories, which leads them
wrongly to deny the relevance of gender difference in moral develop-
ment. 6 Gilligan documents this difference empirically. She concludes
that a model of moral reasoning based on an ethic of rights and justice is
an incomplete description of human experience; studying the moral de-
velopment of women reveals a complementary ethic of care and
response. 117
Robin West locates gender difference not in psychology but in differ-
ing philosophical conceptions of the self." From her analysis of mascu-
line jurisprudence (which hitherto had been wrongly regarded as a
universal jurisprudence) and feminist theory, she concludes that male
legal theorists, both liberals and critical scholars, subscribe to the separa-
113. By "phenomenon of gender difference," I mean to refer to the whole set of biological,
physiological, psychological, legal, social, economic, institutional, environmental, and every other
kind of differential that is experienced by women (or some of them) in comparison to men (or some
of them).
114. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); Robin West, Jurisprudence
and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). See also NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF
MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978); GERMAINE GREER, SEX
AND DESTINY: THE POLITICS OF HUMAN FERTILITY (1984); MARY F. BELENSKY, BLYTHE M.
CLINCHY, NANCY R. GOLDBERGER & JILL M. TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE AND MIND (1986).
115. See GILLIGAN, supra note 114; see also Gilligan's more informal discussion of her work in
The 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law-A
Conversation, 34 BUFFALO. L. REV. 11 (1985), especially at 38ff. For a succinct description of the
effect of Gilligan's work on Lawrence Kohlberg's model of moral development, see Seyla Benhabib,
The Generalized and the Concrete Other, in FEMINISM As CRITIQUE 77 (1988).
116. "Implicitly adopting the male life as the norm, they have tried to fashion women out of a
masculine cloth." GILLIGAN, supra note 114, at 6.
117. "While an ethic ofjustice proceeds from the premise of equality - that everyone should be
treated the same - an ethic of care rests on the premise of nonviolence - that no one should be
hurt... This dialogue between fairness and care not only provides a better understanding of relations
between the sexes but also gives rise to a more comprehensive portrayal of adult work and family
relationships." Id. at 174.
118. West, supra note 114.
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tion thesis (the view that the self is essentially autonomous and independ-
ent)1"9 whereas feminist theorists, both cultural feminists and radical
feminists, subscribe to the connection thesis (the view that the self is es-
sentially communal and interdependent). 20 Further, she argues, while
the separation thesis is trivially true of men, it is "patently untrue of
women."'' The insight in the work of writers like Gilligan and West is
to reveal how deep difference can flow, to suggest that even psychological
and philosophical assertions may not be true for everyone.
Other feminists, perhaps most notably Catharine MacKinnon, iden-
tify a very different locus of difference between women and men.'
22
Although she agrees'with Gilligan that universal norms are male norms,
MacKinnon argues that male norms are not abandoned by asserting that
women are different from men because whenever a sameness/difference
assertion is made, it is always made in relation to men. 2 a Thus, the dif-
ference between men and women is that men get to be the status quo, the
universal standard. The reason for this difference is power. Gender is
fundamentally a question of dominance not difference; to reduce it to
difference is to mask the root of the problem:
119. This is "the proposition that '[w]hat separates us is in some important sense prior to what
connects us - epistemologically prior as well as morally prior. We are distinct individuals first, and
then we form relationships and engage in co-operative arrangements with others; hence the priority
of plurality over unity.'" Id. at 2, quoting Sandel, supra note 24, at 133.
Whereas liberal theorists celebrate autonomy, communitarians seek to emphasize the connections
between autonomous selves.
120. The connection thesis is "perhaps the central insight of feminist theory of the last decade
[which] has been that women are 'essentially connected,' not 'essentially separate,' from the rest of
human life, both materially, through pregnancy, intercourse, and breast-feeding, and existentially,
through the moral and practical life." Id. at 3.
Cultural feminists like Carol Gilligan value the intimacy of connection and dread the isolation of
separation; radical feminists like Catharine MacKinnon dread the intrusiveness of connection and
long for the independence separation affords. Id. at 15.
121. Id. at 2.
122. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON
(1987)]; Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agendafor Theory, 7
SIGNS 515 (1982) [hereinafter Mackinnon (1982)]; Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Juris-
prudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983); MacKinnon, supra note 1. See also ANDREA DWORKIN, INTER-
COURSE (1987) and WOMAN HATING (1974); Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and
Lesbian Existence, in POWERS OF DESIRE (1983).
123. "[M]an has become the measure of all things. Under the sameness standard, women are
measured according to our correspondence with man, our equality judged by our proximity to his
measure. Under the difference standard, we are measured according to our lack of correspondence
with him, our womanhood judged by our distance from his measure .... Think about it like those
anatomy models in medical school. A male body is the human body; all those extra things women
have are studied in ob/gyn." MACKINNON (1987), supra note 122, at 34. See also Mitchell Lecture,
supra note 115, at 20-21.
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Gender equality pervades the way we think. If a concept like difference is a
conceptual tool of gender inequality, it cannot deconstruct the master's
house. Especially when it has built it. Difference is what the gender system
says it is; dominance it denies - only this should be a clue.124
The point that conceptual tools generated in any particular ideologi-
cal climate tend to perpetuate that ideology is well-taken. But it should
not be taken too far. To suggest that the tools forged within an ideology
can only do the work of that ideology denies our creative potential and, if
the ideology is pervasive, leads inevitably to despair. It is within our
power to imagine concepts with which to challenge oppressive ideologies
or to use existing concepts in ways that serve different ideologies (with
due caution that such tools can always be turned against us). This power
gives us the hope and inspiration that are the preconditions for real
change.
Building upon the radical feminist insight that the source of much of
the phenomenon of gender difference is power and is therefore neither
objective nor immutable, other feminists have explored how this hierar-
chy of difference is constructed. They have set out to demonstrate how
current ways of understanding difference are paradoxical and incoherent,
and to locate areas in which these paradoxical notions of difference have
wreaked harm on those considered different. For example, Martha Mi-
now deconstructs the sameness/difference conundrum by identifying
three versions of the dilemma of difference: differences are maintained
both by ignoring and by noticing the differences; both neutral and non-
neutral rules reinforce differences; and neither formal rules nor discretion
through individualized decision-making necessarily redresses problems 6f
difference. 125
The feminist version of the dilemma of difference goes as follows:
you believe women are really more (or less) like men with respect to a
particular issue but you see that they are not being treated equally, so
you develop a strategy to overcome the problem by means of a legal rule
that treats women less (or more) like men, but then you see that it's not
working, that the rule is hurting those you meant to help, so you develop
a new rule, one that treats women more (or less) like men and you criti-
cize the old rule as being the cause of the problem, but then you
see. ... 126 Examples of this circular story include the successes and fail-
124. MACKINNON (1987), supra note 122, at 9.
125. Minow, supra note 108, at 12-13.
126. This is my attempt to paraphrase Kathleen Lahey's more eloquent rendition of this spiral.
Lahey,... Until Women Themselves Have Told All That They Have To Tell..., 23 OSGOODE HALL
L. J. 519, 538-40 (1985). To my mind, it evokes an image of the dragon who tries to eat its tail,
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ures of legal recognition of battered woman syndrome, of no-fault di-
vorce, of gender neutral child custody rules, support and property
division laws, and of pornography regulation.1 27 The root of these para-
doxes is revealed when it is understood that difference is not an objective
fact, but a socially constructed relation. More accurately, it is the con-
struction of a relationship by someone from an often unstated reference
point for some purpose. All statements of difference are a matter of per-
spective and there is no neutral status quo. 
28
In sum, feminists have shown that difference has two aspects. It is
both distinction (women and men differ) and hierarchy (women are dif-
ferent from men), where one half of the distinction becomes a norm from
which the other half is distinguished. The problem with difference is that
the neutrality of evident distinctions between men and women (whether
psychological, philosophical or otherwise) masks the hierarchical content
of gender difference, which is inevitably a function of power and perspec-
tive. Feminist attempts to uproot from our own thoughts as well as from
our institutions the consequences of difference-dilemma type reasoning
shows how hard it is to resist the irresistable urge to rank.
B. Learning Difference
This is about applying the lessons learned in locating difference to
feminism, thereby turning the critique of the construction of inter-gender
difference inward, so as to expose oppressive constructions (and suppres-
sions) of intra-gender difference. 129 Feminists are no more immune from
the effects of power and privilege than anyone else; ego- and ethno- centr-
spinning round faster and faster, failing to see the impossibility of its situation. Feminists have at
least noticed what they are doing and are trying to figure out how to stop.
127. See id. at 538-40, especially nn. 49-53. The story has been told frequently in family law. See
Martha Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change: A Study of
Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 789;
Frances Olsen, The Family and The Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1497 (1983); LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985).
128. See Minow, supra note 108, at 13-14. Minow articulates five unstated assumptions that
underlie the dilemma of difference: first, difference is intrinsic and not relational; second, there is a
suppressed norm by which to measure; third, there is a neutral observer who lacks a perspective;
fourth, other perspectives are irrelevant; fifth, the status quo is natural, uncoerced and good. Id. at
32-58. See also LORDE, supra note 38, at 116.
129. "The oppression of women knows no racial or ethnic boundaries, true, but that does not
mean it is identical within those boundaries.. .To deal with one without even alluding to the other is
to distort our commonality as well as our difference." LORDE, supra note 38, at 70; see also id. at
122.
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ism are part of everyone's identity. We all share an (unfortunate) affinity
for stereotypes, grand theories and simple models.
How do women differ from each other? By ethnicity (by religion,
origin, nationality, culture, language and more); by class;13 by sexual
preference;13' by life experience,132 including our families;' 33 by educa-
tion, ideology and political adherence; and by physical and mental abil-
ity. "All women are women but there is no being who is only a
woman."' 34 We have oppressed each other by failing to perceive each
and all of these differences - they are not merely interesting variations,
differences matter. Hierarchy and dominance pervade and construct
every classification of difference. This means that not only are white wo-
men different from Black women, 135 but Black women confronting the
sexism of Black men are confronting something different than white wo-
men confronting the sexism of white men. 136 And Black women differ
from each other according to class and sexual preference, and they also
differ from other women of Color.
137
White women have been the spokeswomen for feminism; they have
created feminism in their image, an image which constructs gender as the
sole basis of women's oppression, cloaked in the privileges and power
attached to being white. 138 To imply, as many white feminists have done,
130. "[T]o refer to the power 'all men have over all women' makes it look as if my relationship
to the bank vice president I am asking for a loan is just like my relationship to the man who empties
my wastebasket at the office each night." SPELMAN, supra note 106, at 186 (critiquing MacKinnon's
assertion in MacKinnon (1982), supra note 122, at 517 for ignoring class differences).
131. See Rich, supra note 122.
132. Kline describes some of the distinctive life experiences of First Nations women in Canada.
Kline, supra note 108, at 124-28. In general, "women do not come from a shared social position. We
are divided from each other by class, race and other factors that affect our relative positions in the
social hierarchy of our present society." Id. at 141.
133. Id. at 122-23.
134. SPELMAN, supra note 106, at 102.
135. Audre Lorde eloquently captures one aspect of this difference: "Some problems we share as
women, some we do not. You fear your children will grow up to join the patriarchy and testify
against you, we fear our children will be dragged from a car and shot down in the street, and you will
turn your backs upon the reasons they are dying." LORDE, supra note 38, at 119.
136. "Black feminism is not white feminism in blackface." Id. at 60. See also SPELMAN, supra
note 106, at 104-06. Spelman points out that in a society where one race considers itself superior to
another, it is hardly likely to perceive or construct the gender relations between men and women of
that race as the same as gender relations between women and men of the race it considers inferior.
Id. at 173. And, of course, the sexism of white men against Black women is different from the sexism
of Black men against white women is different from the sexism of rich men against poor women is
different from...
137. LORDE, supra note 38, at 120-21, 127-28.
138. hooks argues that such feminism is an inadequate basis for truly feminist theory: "privi-
leged feminists have largely been unable to speak to, with and for diverse groups of women because
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that the gender oppression experienced by privileged white women is the
same gender oppression experienced by all women denies the reality of
many women's lives. It fragments the identities of women of Color be-
cause it assigns the ways in which we do not fit the dominant model of
gender to the non-gendered part of us, paradoxically diminishing the im-
portance of gender oppression in our lives. Women of Color may be
driven to focus on racial oppression because what we are told gender
oppression is is not what we feel. Regina Austin asks minority women:
[W]hen was the last time someone asked you to choose between being a
woman and being a minority person or asked you to assess the hardships
and struggles of your life in terms of your being a woman on top of being
black (or whatever color you are) or a black on top of being a woman, as if
being a woman or being black were like icing on a cake. As if you and your
kind were not an integrated, undifferentiated complete whole with a con-
sciousness or politics of your own. As if you should be content to be a foot
soldier in someone else's army of liberation. As if the ring leader should not
be a person like yourself doubly and affectively bound to the community of
the oppressed. Of course to insist on your own vision would be divisive and
you don't want to be divisive, do you? 13
9
How does white feminism accomplish this? In many ways: by over-
looking the relevance of ethnicity, class and other differentials when con-
sidering how an issue affects women; by selecting as feminist issues
matters that primarily address the experiences of white women (or some
group of them); by constructing overly simple (and, therefore, inaccurate
and excluding) models of oppression." White feminism which denies its
whiteness commits the error of disembodied thinking (or so-
they either do not understand fully the inter-relatedness of sex, race, and class oppression or refuse
to take this inter-relatedness seriously. Feminist analyses of women's lot tend to focus exclusively on
gender and do not provide a solid foundation on which to construct feminist theory .... Certainly it
has been easier for women who do not experience race or class oppression to focus exclusively on
gender." HOOKS, supra note 40, at 14. See also LORDE, supra note 38; Austin, supra note 108; Kline,
supra note 108, at 122-23.
For "race" and "class" you can also substitute "ethnicity", "sexual preference", and other classi-
fications of difference.
139. Austin, supra note 108, at 540. See also LORDE, supra note 38, at 115, 120; SPELMAN,
supra note 106, at 114-32, especially at 123, 166.
140. Kline illustrates these failings in her analysis of the work of a number of feminist legal
scholars. Examples include failing to consider that women's experiences of the criminal justice sys-
tem differ according to their class and ethnicity in feminist critiques of the system; feminist reform
efforts in areas of family law such as child custody and property division (for example, the feminist
lobbying that resulted in Ontario's Family Law Act, ch. 4, ONT. STAT. 26, 28 (1986), which provides
for presumptive equal division of property upon marriage breakdown) which are really only relevant
to the lives of middle-class (mostly white) women; and "adding on" race, class and other "additional
factors" to a theory that is built on a conception of gender as an isolated site of oppression. Kline,
supra note 108, at 124-44.
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matophobia)... and descends into white solipsism, which is "a tunnel
vision which simply does not see non-white experience or existence as
precious or significant, unless in spasmodic, impotent guilt-reflexes,
which have little or no long-term, continuing momentum or political use-
fulness."142 White feminist solipsism is a deep and pervasive collective
mind set which preserves existing privilege and power by envisioning
(and using its power to impose) an essence of 'womanness' in its own
image that makes anyone who doesn't fit the model a not-woman:
The problem with the "story of man" was that women couldn't recog-
nize themselves in it. So those who produce the "story of woman" want to
make sure they appear in it. The best way to ensure that is to be the story-
teller.... Essentialism works well in behalf of these aims, aims that subvert
the very process by which women might come to see where and how they
wish to make a common cause. For essentialism invites me to take what I
understand to be true of me as a "woman" for some golden nugget of
womanness all women have as women; and it makes the participation of
other women inessential to the production of the story. How lovely: the
many turn out to be one; and the one that they are is me.143
The point of the critique is not to trash white feminism (or white
feminists) but to reveal its partialness and perspective. So understood,
white feminism is no longer illegitimate or oppressive and can take its
place with other feminist perspectives in a collective effort to resist sexist
oppression against all women and not only some of them. The project of
141. Spelman criticizes feminists such as de Beauvior and Firestone who have argued that wo-
men have been too tied to our bodies. She notes first, that the idea that some bodies (women's,
Black's) are less valuable than others underlies racist as well as sexist ideology so it is odd that
feminists would share it; second, that the more a group perceives its liberation to hinge upon escap-
ing the body and bodily tasks, the more likely it is to predicate its freedom upon the oppression of
others who must assume responsibility for those bodies and tasks; third, that asking women to forget
their bodies means asking them also to forget their color and to deny the particularity of their
experiences of the world. SPELMAN, supra note 106, at 126-30.
Seyla Benhabib and Robin West have demonstrated that disembodied conceptions of self and self-
other relations are inadequate to ground moral philosophy and jurisprudence. BENHABIB, supra
note 115; West, supra note 114.
142. SPELMAN, supra note 106, at 126 (quoting ADRIENNE RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SI-
LENCE 306 (1979)).
143. SPELMAN, supra note 106, at 160. Spelman gives some telling examples of the insidiousness
of this way of thinking, which keeps white feminists at center-stage even when they try with the best
of intentions to respond to the minority critique, in her deconstructions of three statements com-
monly made by white feminists: "Feminist theory must take differences among women into consider-
ation" (who is doing the considering? whose differences are to be considered and how?); "we need to
hear the voices of many women" (who is "we"? what is the "need"? what does "hearing" involve?);
"feminist theory must include more of the experiences of women of different races and classes" (who
gets to decide who is included? "including" doesn't alter the "insider" status of the inviter or the
"outsider" status of the guest). Id. at 162-63.
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ridding feminism of its essentialist models is far from easy, however, for
it is not confined to white women; it is reproduced within each classifica-
tion in the complex hierarchy of difference. And, as the critique of white
feminism suggests, the experience of one kind of oppression does not nec-
essarily sensitize us to other kinds of oppression. In fact, our preoccupa-
tion with our own causes may cloud our perceptions, obscuring the
sufferings of others. As Audre Lorde says, "it is very difficult to stand
still and to listen to another woman's voice delineate an agony I do not
share, or one to which I myself have contributed."' 44
Where is feminism left when it has learned this lesson of differ-
ence-with questions and confusions. White feminists cannot remain the
sole voice of feminism; feminists cannot avoid complexity or adopt a su-
perficial additive approach 145 to differences between women for the sake
of conceptual purity or even for the sake of political strategy. Such a
feminism would be hypocritical as well as hegemonic. But white femi-
nists may be trapped in their position of dominance: apologizing for and
feeling guilty about privilege only preserves the existing hierarchy of
power; imagining the positions and perspectives of others is similarly
flawed. Tolerance and even despair do not change the status quo.146 To
really change things, white feminists must cede their position of domi-
nance - and giving up power is never easy for anyone. Even if the will
was there, who can receive such bounty? If there is no essence of femi-
nism or gender; 47 if all knowledge is partial, positioned and controver-
sial;' 48 if there is no such thing as a neutral description; 149 and even
language is tainted, 150 how can anyone speak for a group? Learning dif-
ference leads to deeply disturbing inquiries about representative author-
ity15 1 and whether feminism itself is a coherent concept:
144. LORDE, supra note 38, at 128. Randall Kennedy makes a related point when he argues,
with respect to race, that membership in an oppressed group alone does not "compel" a person to
actively struggle to end its oppression. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L.
REv. 1745, 1799-1800 (1989).
145. That is, an approach which says, I am a woman AND brown AND middle class AND
heterosexual AND able-bodied ..... See SPELMAN supra note 106, at 114-32; see also Kline's de-
scription of "commatization" in Kline, supra note 108, at 145-46.
146. SPELMAN, supra note 106, especially at 5, 175, 178-84.
147. Id. at 14, 81, 133 and elsewhere.
148. Kline, supra note 108, at 149-50.
149. SPELMAN, supra note 106, at 139-42.
150. Id. at 164.
151. For example, Kline asks whether as a white woman she should be writing about women of
Color. Kline, supra note 108, at 4. See also Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality
of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295, 297-99 (1988); See also
HOOKS, supra note 5, at 43. The implicit suggestion that one's ethnicity (or race) may delegitimate
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[T]he paradox at the heart of feminism: Any attempt to talk about all wo-
men in terms of something we have in common undermines attempts to talk
about the differences among us, and vice versa. Is it possible to give the
things women have in common their full significance without thereby im-
plying that the differences among us are less important? How can we de-
scribe the things that differentiate women without eclipsing what we share
in common?
1 5 2
And doesn't "what we have in common" and "the things that differenti-
ate women" vary with the perspective of every single woman?
C. Living Difference
1 3
This area of feminist thought attempts to go beyond the painful
stage of learning difference. It seeks to renegotiate feminist identity,1 54 to
develop new grounds for feminist theory, to find ways for feminists to
work together, and to turn outward into the world to catalyze the
counterhegemonic, destablizing processes of locating and learning differ-
ence in the social structures that oppress women in all our various collec-
tive identities. Renegotiating feminist identity starts by learning to accept
some humbling truths: namely, that "everybody wants difference but no-
body wants anybody to really be different" ' and that we all have the
capacity to dominate as well as the capacity to be dominated.156 It means
learning to think in new ways about difference and reformulating femi-
nism (in theory and in practice) around that new conception.
1 57
one's work, or preclude certain people from even embarking upon certain areas of study is vigorously
criticized by Randall Kennedy, who argues race should be entirely extraneous to the intellectual
realm. Kennedy, supra note 144, at 1801-10. I agree that any suggestion that ethnicity or race alone
should determine the worth of a work is profoundly misguided. However, I believe that the ethnicity
of the author is relevant to the work: no one writes in an intellectual vacuum, our insights and
analyses are shaped by our experiences including our experiences of ethnicity. Open acknowledg-
ment of that background significantly adds to an appreciation of the richness of our collective
thought - but it should never function as a bar to making a contribution.
152. SPELMAN, supra note 106, at 3.
153. "Living" is not a passive term, it suggests that feminism is something you do, not
something you are; it is dynamic, presenting feminism as something to be worked at and worked for.
154. I have taken the phrase "renegotiating identity" from Benhabib & Cornell, Beyond the
Politics of Gender, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE, supra note 115, at 12-13 ("whereas communitarians
emphasize the situatedness of the disembedded self in a network of relations and narratives, feminists
also begin with the situated self but view the renegotiation of our psychosexual identities, and their
autonomous reconstitution by individuals as essential to women's and human liberation"). See also
Greschner, supra note 24.
155. bell hooks used this phrase in her talk, The Radical Subjectivity of African-American Ex-
perience (Harvard Law School, March 3, 1989).
156. HOOKS, supra note 5, at 20.
157. Sandra Harding speaks of "embracing" our multiple identities, viewing them as a cause for
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As theory and as critique of existing theory, renegotiated feminism
embraces the quality of complexity, based upon the conviction that:
tensions, contradictions and ambivalences within and between theories are
not always bad. Coherent theories in an obviously incoherent world are
either silly and uninteresting or oppressive and problematic, depending on
the degree of hegemony they manage to achieve.
158
Renegotiated feminist theory is willing to adopt heuristic approaches
which enhance imaginative potential and move away from the fetters of
formal justifications and universal proofs. It seeks an intimate relation-
ship with feminist practice because it conceptualizes the relation between
theory and practice not hierarchically but holistically, each continuously
directing the development of the other and so progressing together.
Seyla Benhabib has advanced a conception of the self and self-other
relations in the context of moral philosophy which holds promise as a
theoretical foundation for a renegotiated feminism.5 9 She criticizes ex-
tant universalistic (male) moral theories as "substitutionalist," arguing
that "the universalism they defend is defined surreptitiously by identify-
ing the experiences of a specific group of subjects as the paradigmatic
case of the human as such. The subjects are invariably white, male adults
who are propertied or at least professional."' 60 Substitutionalist theories
fall into error because they are constructed from the standpoint of the
"generalized other," a conception which, by generalizing that which the
other has in common with the self, denies the "otherness" of the other. 16'
Uncovering this do-as-you-would-be-done-by moral stance reveals the
epistemic circularity in moral theories, for example, John Rawls' theory
of justice as fairness, 162 which assume a generalized other; they hinge
celebration and exhilaration, not as a weakness. HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM
163-96, especially 163, 193 (1986).
158. Id. at 164. Kline complicates some existing feminist legal analyses. Kline, supra note 108.
Lahey discusses feminist methodologies to assist in this endeavour. Lahey, supra note 126, at 528-37.
Austin cautions feminists to be wary of the tendency to erect monoliths and to generalize, and to
reject all romanticizations of difference. Austin, supra note 108.
159. BENHABIB, supra note 115. The philosophical basis for the themes in this short essay is
developed at length in SEYLA BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NORM AND UTOPIA: A STUDY OF THE FOUN-
DATIONS OF CRITICAL THEORY (1986).
160. BENHABIB, supra note 115, at 81.
161. The standpoint of the generalized other "requires us to view each and every individual as a
rational being entitled to the same rights and duties we would want to ascribe to ourselves. In assum-
ing the standpoint, we abstract from the individuality and the concrete identity of the other. We
assume that the other, like ourselves, is a being who has concrete needs, desires, and affects, but that
what constitutes his or her moral dignity is not what differentiates us from each other, but rather
what we, as speaker and acting rational agents, have in common." Id. at 87.
162. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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upon the capacity, "to put oneself imaginatively in the place of the other,
but under conditions of 'the veil of ignorance', the other as different from
the self, disappears."' 63 Elizabeth Spelman's comment bears repeating,
"How lovely: the many turn out to be one, and the one that they are is
me.,, 164
Benhabib articulates an alternative conception of self-other relations
which:
requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a
concrete history, identity and affective-emotional constitution. In assuming
this standpoint we abstract from what constitutes our commonality. We
seek to comprehend the needs of the other, his or her motivations, what s/
he searches for, what s/he desires.
1 65
The process I have called 'learning difference' is an illustration of what it
means to adopt the standpoint of the concrete other. And, as the ques-
tions raised by that process show, a conception of the other that only
encompasses his or her particularity cannot be the basis for either theo-
retical or practical action. 166 Benhabib's central insight is to posit the
perspective of the concrete other not as prescription, but as critique.
Working as a complement to the ideology-generating perspective of the
generalized other, the concrete other "designates the ideological limits of
universalistic discourse."167 This "interactive universalism" avoids both
the oppressiveness and exclusivity of substitutionalist moral theories and
the paradoxical paralysis of an obsession with the difference of the con-
crete other by recognizing that we are at the same time the same and
different.t 68 An interactive theory "allow[s] us to recognize the dignity of
the generalized other through an acknowledgement of the moral identity
163. BENHABIB, supra note 115, at 89.
164. SPELMAN, supra note 106, at 160.
165. BENHABIB, supra note 115, at 87.
166. Benhabib asks: "Since our identities as concrete others are what distinguish us from each
other according to gender, race, class, cultural differentials, as well as psychic and natural abilities,
would a moral theory restricted to the standpoint of the concrete other not be a racist, sexist, cul-
tural relativist, discriminatory one?" Id. at 92. In other words, can anyone say anything at all?
167. Id. at 92.
168. Differences and commonalities operate at different levels of abstraction: it is true in general
that all women (or some group of them) share certain commonalities, it is also and at the same time
true that any such statement "is bound to suffer from ethnocentrism if we claim for it more general-
ity than it has". SPELMAN, supra note 106, at 131. It is therefore important to identify for any
particular assertion of commonality at what level of abstraction it operates. For example, "all wo-
men are oppressed" is true at a very high level of abstraction and is useful in contexts where great
abstraction is appropriate; but to assert this in a context where it suggests that all women suffer from
the same oppression is to suppress difference and claim too much generality. Generally, the more
concrete the context, the more important are the differences.
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of the concrete other." '169 It "acknowledges the plurality of modes of be-
ing human, and differences among humans, without endorsing all these
pluralities and differences as morally and politically valid." 170 It is this
insight which offers a theoretical basis for reorganizing law so as to per-
mit difference rather than to penalize it.
Such a theoretical foundation has sufficient flex in it to permit a
dynamic and unstable interaction between the general and the particular,
commonality and difference, which contains its own self-correcting, self-
educating mechanisms. Thus, it provides ongoing inspiration for feminist
practice. It encourages feminism to move away from its claim to be a
status and an identity, and to build instead upon its political aims. Rene-
gotiated feminist practice demands of feminists much more than a shared
label, it requires a "critical political consciousness," a commitment to
action.' Feminists must not only seek to end gender oppression but also
should care about the way we do it. We must concern ourselves with
process as well as substance, and look for practices which respect the
concrete other. Feminists must seek solidarity,172 which means develop-
ing practical strategies for working together across differences, for build-
ing coalitions and alliances between women without submerging their
distinctiveness in an oppressive homogeneity. So renegotiated, feminism
as theory and practice can help us escape from the vicious spiral of previ-
ous feminist reforms, out of the sameness/difference trap, releasing our
imaginations to explore truly revolutionary directions for change.
The feminist dialectic of locating-learning-living difference that I
169. BENHABIB, supra note 115, at 92.
170. Id. at 81. Feminist critiques of the current (raging) debate between liberal (Ronald Dwor-
kin, John Rawls) and communitarian theorists (Alasdair McIntyre, Michael Sandel) have made sim-
ilar insights about the nature of the self through their analysis of the flaws in both the liberal and
communitarian conceptions. While the liberal model of the choosing, autonomous, "unencumbered"
self recognizes subjective agency, it suffers from the flaws of disembodied thinking; while the com-
munitarian constituted self recognizes the role of community in shaping identity, it leaves women
trapped in a past and present of sexism. A conception of the self which recognizes situatedness and
autonomy is the only conception of the self which allows women to renegotiate their identities. See
Greschner, supra note 24; Benhabib & Cornell, supra note 154; and West, supra note 114, at 70-71
(proposals for a "jurisprudence unmodified").
171. HOOKS, supra note 40, at 24; see also id. at 17-31.
172. "Working collectively to confront difference, to expand our awareness of sex, race, and
class as interlocking systems of domination, of the ways we reinforce and perpetuate those struc-
tures, is the context in which we learn the true meaning of solidarity. It is this work that must be the
foundation of feminist movement." HOOKS, supra note 5, at 25; see also HOOKS, supra note 40, at 43-
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have outlined can be understood as a struggle with the inevitability of
ethnocentrism, a fight against our tendencies toward pernicious ethno-
centrism-racism and discrimination, exclusion and oppression. It is a
collective effort to reorganize feminism around an enlightened ethnocen-
trism whose goal is to celebrate the complicated multiplicity of our group
identities, to permit them to coexist, interact and enrich each other with-
out falling into patterns of dominance and oppression. Ultimately, this is
a vision of a world where difference means diversity, not hierarchy; a
world in which it will be possible to say, 'I am white' (or brown or male
or female or... ) without also saying that someone who is not is some-
thing less. In short, a world where the language of inclusion is not also
the language of oppression.
IV. LESSON THREE: LIVING-PUTTING THEORY INTO CONTEXT
The project of the final portion of this paper is to turn this admit-
tedly utopian vision to the reality of Canadian cultural pluralism in order
to determine whether feminist insights can be usefully applied to the
problems of cultural difference. I do not mean to suggest that feminism is
a perfect analog or microcosm of Canada or that the developments I
have identified in various areas of feminist thought are prescriptions for a
speedy cure for cultural conflicts in Canada or anywhere else. That
would be too simple. Although the evolution of feminism in recent years
is an important example of how a cross-cultural group has struggled to
come to terms with its ethnic diversity, there are two basic reasons why
the feminist experience cannot be transported wholesale into the cultural
context. First, the relationship between feminism and ethnicity is itself
complex. Feminism is not neutral with respect to culture. In fact, femi-
nism seeks to change many practices of existing cultures. Because its the-
ories and strategies have been created to assist in exposing and reforming
sexist oppression in all cultures, feminism does not readily lend itself to
preserving those aspects of ethnicity that are predicated upon sexism.
Tools fashioned for a particular purpose - a feminist purpose - are not
necessarily going to be helpful in accomplishing an antithetical purpose
- preserving sexist cultural practices.
Second, to state the obvious, there are a number of differences be-
tween the group of people behind the name 'feminism' and the group of
people behind the name 'Canada'. Feminism is a movement, not a state,
which means that it is more flexible and more responsive to change; it
lacks the institutional structures that act as a retarding force on change.
Feminism, unlike a state, does not have to be comprehensive in scope; a
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movement is much simpler than a country. Further, feminists have a
common and readily identifiable oppressor (in the abstract, at least)
which gives the movement a clear sense of purpose. Although struggles
about defining feminism are real and important, they all revolve around
the general theme of resisting (reducing, ending) gender oppression. The
same is not true of Canada. Lacking a shared perception of even an ab-
stract common oppressor or 'other', Canadians have little incentive to
make the considerable effort to work together across differences or even
to agree upon a basic set of purposes to animate cooperative efforts.
Although many Canadians have experienced some form of oppression,
we do not often consider that these varied experiences share anything in
common; non-feminists, unlike feminists, are not used to thinking about
difference and how it works against them.
Mindful of these differences, there are nevertheless many avenues of
connection between feminism and cultural diversity. The themes of com-
plication, interaction and multiplicity which animate the feminist ap-
proach do deny the possibility of easy universal answers to problems of
difference, but they do not delegitimate all answers. Feminism offers a
new way to describe and, therefore, to understand problems of cultural
difference with the conviction that an adequate process of descriptiof is
the greater part of any acceptable solution. In that spirit, the discussion
which follows is a description of the kinds of endeavors in which we as a
society must engage if we are serious in our commitment to cultural di-
versity, understood as commitment to ending oppression on the basis of
difference. I will refer to two examples of current cultural conflicts to
illuminate my discussion; the first concerns the former "marrying out"
section of the Indian Act; 173 the second concerns the "distinct society"
clause in the (in)famous Meech Lake Accord."7
The marrying out problem originally centered around the member-
ship rules in the Indian Act which, from their inception in the 19th cen-
tury, had provided that status Indian women who married non-status
men would lose status, but status men who married non-status women
would both retain status and status would be extended to their wives.1
7 5
173. Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, ch. 1-6, § 12(1)(b), repealed by An Act to Amend the Indian Act,
33-34 ELIz. II, 1985, deemed in force as of April 17, 1985, now consolidated in the Indian Act,
R.S.C. (1985) ch. I-5. The issue is strikingly similar to that in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49 (1978).
174. The Constitutional Accord, 1987 [hereinafter Meech Lake or the Accord].
175. For some academic discussion of this issue, see generally, Berger, supra note 72; Douglas
Sanders, The Renewal of Indian Special Status, in EQUALITY RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CHAR-
TER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, supra note 18, at 529 [hereinafter Sanders (1985)]; P. Kirby, Mar-
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In 1974, the Supreme Court rejected Jeannette Lavell's challenge to the
legislation under the equality guarantee of the Canadian Bill of Rights,
upholding the marrying out rule in a much-criticized decision that failed
to address the complex gender equality and cultural issues presented by
the case.' 76 The political controversy about marrying out continued after
the decision in both Indian and non-Indian communities. In 1981, it re-
ceived international recognition when the Human Rights Committee
found that the exclusion of Sandra Lovelace from reserve lands pursuant
to section 12(l)(b) violated her right to enjoyment of her culture under
section 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 1
77
Lobbying by Indian and non-Indian groups for the repeal of section
12(l)(b), both before and after Lovelace, was complicated by the lack of
consensus as to what should replace it, raising the more general question
whether continued federal imposition of uniform membership rules on all
status bands was itself violative of aboriginal cultural autonomy. The leg-
islation that was eventually enacted178 was a compromise; it repealed the
marrying out rule while retaining federal jurisdiction over determination
of status and, for the first time, partly separated the concept of status
from that of band membership, giving band councils some measure of
autonomy over the latter. 179 The new provisions are currently the subject
rying Out and Loss of Status: The Charter and the New Indian Act Legislation, 1 J.L. & SOC. POL'Y
77 (1985); Michael MacDonald, Indian Status: Colonialism or Sexism, 9 CAN. COMMUNITY L. J. 23
(1986); David Matas, Indian Women's Rights, 6 MAN. L.J. 195 (1974-75); Douglas Sanders, Indian
Women: A Brief History of their Roles and Rights, 21 MCGILL L. J. 656 (1975) [hereinafter Sanders
(1975)]; Douglas Sanders, Indian Statuss: A Woman's Issue or an Indian Issue?, 3 C.N.L.R. 30 [1984]
[hereinafter Sanders (1984)]; KATHLEEN JAMIESON, INDIAN WOMEN AND THE LAW IN CANADA:
CITIZENS MINUS (1978); Camille Jones, Towards Equal Rights and Amendment of Section 12(1)(b)
of the Indian Act: A Post-Script to Lovelace v. Canada, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 195 (1985).
176. A.G. Canada v. Lavell [1974] S.C.R. 1349. Various Native organizations intervened in the
case: the status organizations jointly intervened in support of the legislation, as did the Treaty Voice
of Alberta (an Indian women's organization) concerned that invalidation of the marrying out rule
would threaten the concept of special status for Indians that was the basis for all of the protections in
the Indian Act; others, such as the Native Council of Canada (representing Metis and non-status
Indians) and Indian Rights for Indian Women intervened in support of Jeannette Lavell. See Sanders
(1985), supra note 175, at 540-47 and Sanders, supra note 175, at 666.
177. Lovelace v. Canada, supra note 98. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
(entered into force March 23, 1976) provides: "In those States in which... minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or use their own
language." See also NEW BRUNSWICK HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 98.
178. supra note 173.
179. For a more detailed description and critique of the effects of the new law, see Kathleen
Jamieson, Sex Discrimination and the Indian Act, in ARDUOUS JOURNEY 130-34 (J. Rich Ponting
ed.)(1986).
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of a Charter challenge by six Alberta bands, with Indian and non-Indian
litigants again pitting sex equality against cultural autonomy. 80
Meech Lake was the next constitutional development in the struggle
between Quebec and the federal government that started with patriation
of the Constitution over the objections of Quebec. 8 The government of
Quebec drew up a list of conditions in the form of constitutional amend-
ments, under which Quebec would sign the Constitution. After a meeting
at Meech Lake, on April 30, 1987, the eleven First Ministers announced
their agreement on a set of amendments which became the Meech Lake
Accord. One of the most volatile provisions in this extremely controver-
sial document was the "distinct society" clause which recognized Quebec
as a "distinct society" within Canada and required the rest of the Consti-
tution to be interpreted consistently with that recognition.182 During the
180. Twinn v. A.G. Canada (Federal Court of Canada; no hearing date scheduled at time of
writing). Intervenor status has been granted to the New Status Indian Association, the Native Coun-
cil of Canada (Alberta) and the Native Council of Canada. Co-defendant status has been granted to
Jean Potskin, a member of the Native Council of Canada. Twinn argues that the new membership
rules violate the aboriginal rights affirmed in § 35 of the Charter because they extend band member-
ship automatically to women who lost status for marrying non-status men, and their children. Band
control over band membership is claimed as an aboriginal right within the meaning of § 35. The
Crown seeks to uphold the validity of the legislation and to narrowly define the concept of aboriginal
rights contained in § 35, arguing that the section contains no right to band control over band mem-
bership. The New Status Indian Association represents individuals who have gained status under the
legislation; they support the status granted by the legislation and argue for a broad construction of
§ 35; they seek to present a Native equality perspective from the standpoint of new status women
and children. The Native Council of Canada seeks to advance the interests of Metis and non-status
Indians; it will argue that the equality guarantee in § 15 of the Charter must be interpreted in light of
the protections for aboriginal peoples in §§ 25 and 35, a position which reflects the concerns of
aboriginal groups in the Lavell case about the potential conflict between a narrow conception of
equality and the concept of special status. See supra note 176.
181. For some of the voluminous academic commentary on this controversy, see generally,
MEECH LAKE: PERSPECTIVES FROM WESTERN CANADA (Roger Gibbons ed., 1988) [hereinafter
PERSPECTIVES]; PETER HOGG, MEECH LAKE CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORD ANNOTATED (1988);
CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS, supra note 6; LE DEVOIR, LE QUOBEC ET LE LAC MEECH (1987);
BRYAN SCHWARTZ, FATHOMING MEECH LAKE (1987); CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION (QUEBEC),
L'ADHESION DU OUtBEC A L'ACCORD DU LAC MEECH (1988).
182. The section provides:
2. (1) The Constitution of Canada shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with
(a) the recognition that the existence of French-speaking Canadians, centered in Quebec but
also present elsewhere in Canada, and English-speaking Canadians, concentrated outside
Quebec but also present in Quebec, constitutes a fundamental characteristic of Canada;
and
(b) the recognition that Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct society.
(2) The role of the Parliament of Canada and the provincial legislatures to preserve the fundamental
characteristic of Canada referred to in paragraph (1) (a) is affirmed.
(3) The role of the legislature and Government of Quebec to preserve and promote the distinct
identity of Quebec referred to in paragraph (I) (b) is affirmed.
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month following the initial announcement of this provision, there were
numerous submissions made by aboriginal and immigrant groups and a
storm of public debate about the effects of Meech Lake on the rights of
other groups. The result was an amendment to the text of the Accord,
announced on June 3, 1987, providing that the distinct society clause
would not affect aboriginal or multicultural protections in the Charter.I 3
Nothing was said about the relationship between the distinct society
clause and the equality provisions in sections 15 and 28 of the Charter.
In order to come into force, Meech Lake had to be ratified by the
legislatures of the provinces and by Parliament by June, 1990.184 To date,
all provinces except Manitoba and New Brunswick have ratified the Ac-
cord but neither of these provinces is likely to approve it in the near
future.'85 The Premier of New Brunswick, siding with Meech Lake's
many critics, has publicly stated his opposition to the Accord; the Pre-
mier of Manitoba withdrew the Accord from consideration by his legisla-
ture in protest over Quebec's use of the Charter's override clause to
protect its unilingual language law after it had been declared unconstitu-
tional.1" 6 The fate of Meech Lake is increasingly uncertain, yet heated
debate about the distinct society clause continues.
One obvious point of intersection between feminist theory and Ca-
nadian cultural conflicts lies in debates by Canadian women about cul-
tural issues. Women have been active in both the marrying out and
Meech Lake controversies. 'Outsider' women and women's groups, that
is, non-Indian and non-French Canadian women, have tended to regard
these two problems as only (or primarily) sex equality issues. Although
(4) Nothing in this section derogates from the powers, rights or privileges of Parliament or the
Government of Canada, or of the legislatures or governments of the provinces, including any
powers, rights or privileges relating to language.
183. Section 16 of the Accord provides:
16. Nothing in section 2 of the Constitution Act, 1867 [the section added by Meech Lake] affects
section 25 or 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982 or class 24 of section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
184. It has been argued that there is no time limit on ratification. See, e.g., The Globe & Mail,
January 11, 1989, at A7 (letter to the editor).
185. Most recently, the premier of Newfoundland, Clyde Wells, has threatened to revoke his
province's ratification of the Accord.
186. The law in issue was Bill 101 (The Charter of the French Language) which mandated the
use of French only on commercial signs; these provisions were held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court of Canada on December 15, 1988 in Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712. On December 19,
1988 Premier Bourassa introduced Bill 178 in the Quebec National Assembly which reenacted provi-
sions very similar to those the Court had struck down and provided that they would operate
notwithstanding the Charter. The statute was enacted two days later, on December 21, 1988: An Act
to Amend the Charter of the French language, S.Q. 1988, ch. 54, § 10.
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they have acknowledged the importance of claims for cultural autonomy
(aboriginal control over membership and Quebec control over "distinc-
tiveness"), the conflict is perceived as clear, absolute, and the result must
be that sex equality trumps cultural autonomy. In contrast, insider wo-
men and women's groups have been divided: some agree with the out-
sider women, others with insider men (who argue that cultural autonomy
should trump sexual equality); all consider that what sex equality means
or requires is deeply complicated by the cultural context. For them, the
conflict is perceived as muddy, relative, and the appropriate solution
much less certain.
187
Women's contributions to these two Canadian cultural controversies
closely track some of the divisions between white feminism and its mi-
nority critique. Like white feminists, outsider women identify more
strongly with gender issues than with cultural issues; like white feminists,
outsider women may be reluctant to give up their power to define what is
187. With respect to Meech Lake, outsider women who have argued that the distinct society
clause erodes constitutional sex equality guarantees include Donna Greschner, Kathleen Mahoney,
Lynn Smith, the National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL), the National Action Com-
mittee on the Status of Women (NAC), the Canadian Advisory Committee on the Status of Women
(CACSW) and the Women' s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF). See Greschner, How Not
to Drown in Meech Lake: Rules, Principles and Women's Equality Rights, in CONSTITUTIONAL VI-
SIONS, supra note 6, at 55; Mahoney, Women's Rights, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 181, at 159;
Smith, The Distinct Society Clause in the Meech Lake Accord: Could it Affect Equality Rights for
Women? in CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS, supra note 6, at 35 and the sources cited therein.
Insider women such as Lucie Lamarche and the Femmes regroupe6s pour l'accessibilit6 au
pouvoir politique et 6conomique (FRAPPE) have argued that Meech is likely to impair sex equality
for Quhb6cois women; however, the F6d6ration des femmes du Quebec (FFQ) and the Quebec gov-
ernment's Conseil du statut de ]a femme disagree, suggesting that the distinct society clause poses
not threat to sex equality. See Lucie Lamarche, Perspective fiministe ddne certaine socidtd distincte:
Les Qudbdcoises et l'Accord du Lac Meech, in CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS, supra note 6, at 21 and
Smith, supra note 186.
With respect to marrying out, outsider groups such as the Advisory Council on the Status of
Women and the Canadian Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs have argued
strenuously for repeal of the marrying out rule. Some insider groups have agreed, including Indian
Rights for Indian Women; others, such as the Treaty Voice of Alberta have argued that the mar-
rying out rule represents part of aboriginal culture and should be preserved, and still others, such as
the Native Women's Association of Canada, have tried to take an intermediate position. Sanders
(1985) supra note 175, at 544-45. Douglas Sanders captures the opposing outsider and insider posi-
tions in two statements, the first by the Honorable Judy Erola, the second by Marilyn Kane of the
Native Women's Association of Canada, made to the Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and
Northern Development:
I as the Minister responsible for the Status of Women see this strictly as an issue of
equality, and I think every effort to fuzz the issue and to make it into something else is a
diversionary tactic...
... we are adamant that what we are talking about here are not women's issues. We are
talking about the future of our nations, of our peoples. ...
Sanders, supra note 175, at 30.
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a sex equality issue, to name what constitutes oppression on the basis of
sex. This leads to great potential for misunderstanding between insider
and outsider women: outsiders may raise paternalistic suggestions of false
consciousness; insiders may r~tort with allegations of racism. The femi-
nist dialectic of difference suggests that what sex equality is to aboriginal
women might differ from what it is to Qu6b6cois women which might
differ from what it is to women who do not belong to either of these
groups.188 Because insider women experience these cultural conflicts as
engaging their gender and culture together, listening to what they have to
say to each other, as well as to the tenor of their debate with outsiders (of
gender or culture), might point to humbler, less absolute and universal
solutions which focus on the interests of the group most immediately
oppressed by gender and culture together in each case.
The feminist dialectic of difference is not only useful with respect to
conflicts involving gender and culture. Each of the three areas of locat-
ing, learning and living difference translates into more general sugges-
tions for rethinking different types of problems of multiculturalism and
for perceiving as cultural and contingent what hitherto has been regarded
as neutral and fixed. In surveying some of the avenues into which femi-
nist theory might lead persons concerned with cultural diversity, it be-
comes possible to glimpse, not at a utopia, but at a less oppressive and
less exclusive, a less 'essential' Canadian federation.
Feminism teaches that it is important to locate - to identify and
understand - how differences are constructed. In the context of Cana-
dian cultural pluralism, this means uncovering Canada's 'dominant cul-
ture', identifying how it functions as the backdrop against which the
differences of all cultures are assessed, unmasking its facade of neutral-
ity.' 89 The dominant culture is the culture that is not recognized as a
culture, it is the way things are, the seemingly neutral ground rules, the
institutional structures and values that name what difference is in Cana-
188. With respect to women of the First Nations, see Sanders (1975), supra note 175, at 672;
with respect to Qu6b~cois women, see Lucie Lamarche who asks: "comment peut-on pr6tendre que
ces Qu6b6eoises, victimes de discrimination non seulement en fonction de leur sexe mais aussi de leur
origine ethnique, leur age, leur situation familiale et leur 6tat civil, tirent un 'meilleur avantage' d'une
'culture de l'6galit6 qui ferait partie du concept de soci6 distincte?" Lamarche, supra note 187, at
25. [TRANS: how can it be claimed that Quebec women, victims of discrimination not only in
respect of their sex but also in their ethnic origin, their age, their family situation, and their civil
status, will gain a "greater advantage" from a "culture of equality" that is contained in the concept
of a distinct society?]
189. One example of an analysis which shatters the pretensions to objectivity and universality in
the dominant culture's construction of cultural pluralism is Allan Hutchinson, Telling Tales (Or
Putting the Plural in Pluralism), 23 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 681 (1985).
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dian society. Unmasking the construction of difference by the dominant
culture is a huge multi-faceted project which takes two basic directions:
identifying who and what the dominant culture is, and identifying how
the dominant culture maintains and exercises its hegemony.
Discovering the dominant culture is the task of making visible the
invisible norm 90 or identifying the criteria for membership in the domi-
nant culture and its consequences. A description of a member of the
dominant culture might be: adult, white, male, heterosexual, English-
speaking, thin, loosely Christian, able-bodied, university-educated, pro-
fessional, propertied - all of the things that if you are not, label you as
'different.' 19 Understanding that the vast majority of people do not fully
qualify for membership in this tiny elite is the first step in beginning to
question - and to criticize in all sorts of specific contexts - why things
are arranged for the convenience of this group and not for others., 92 Dis-
covering what the dominant culture is, what its values are and how it
constructs difference requires analyses of all of the 'neutral' fundamental
values underlying our laws and practices, 93 and of the consequences
190. Audre Lorde calls it the "mythical norm": "Somewhere, on the edge of consciousness,
there is what I call a mythical norm, which each one of us in our hearts know 'that is not me.' In
america, this norm is usually defined as white, thin, male, young, heterosexual, christian, and finan-
cially secure. It is with this mythical norm that the trappings of power reside within this society."
Lorde, supra note 38, at 116.
191. Elizabeth Spelman describes the class and racial norms: "Just because some people don't
think of themselves as having any class identity, it doesn't mean that they have none. Indeed, under
certain circumstances, the very lack of awareness of elements of one's identity is a significant reflec-
tion of that identity. For example, being and having a sense of myself as white in this society can be
said to be reflected in the fact that it does not occur to me to note it, nor am I required by convention
to note it: the conventions about self-description allow me to refer to myself simply as a 'woman'.
But if I were a Black woman, people would think I was withholding important information if I did
not qualify 'woman' with 'Black'." SPELMAN, supra note 106, at 96. Canadian conventions differ in
that color is a characteristic that is studiously ignored: the convention is not to describe someone by
his or her color. This can lead to minor absurdities: I have seen people strain to describe people of
Color in a variety of situations in ways that avoid mentioning the obvious distinguishing physical
characteristic. For example, in pointing out a person of Color across a room full of white people the
speaker will avoid mention of color and self-consciously embark upon an awkward description of
clothing and height. This doesn't mean that color is actually irrelevant, indeed, whiteness is just as
much a part of the invisible norm in Canada as in the U.S. - only the convention is to pretend that
it isn't.
192. For example, why the workplace is hostile to the demands of child care; why Sunday is the
universal day of rest; why gay and lesbian relationships are not recognized as "families" for all sorts
of purposes (for receiving state benefits, for family insurance plans, for survivorship tenancy rules);
why most buildings and public transportation assume those who use them can see, climb stairs and
reach a certain height.
193. An obvious source for these values is the Constitution which sets out what the dominant
culture regards as fundamental to its existence; other sources include criminal laws, family laws,
education laws and school curricula. Absorbing the norms imparted by these rules is vital to univer-
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which have been attached to particular labels of difference both presently
and in the past. 194
Uncovering how the dominant culture maintains its hegemony re-
quires analyses of the structures through which cultural diversity is per-
mitted and through which cultural claims are asserted. It means
recognizing that law itself is a cultural phenomenon; the structures
through which problems become cases and cases come to court, and the
processes through which policies and statutes are created all reflect and
maintain the perspective of the dominant culture.19 5
One important technique by which the dominant culture maintains
its dominance, while celebrating cultural diversity, is the concept of tol-
erance. Tolerance is constructed in a way that disguises the extent to
which what diversity is permitted is shaped by the cultural values of the
dominant culture, the fact that that which is tolerated is that which is
consistent with the values of the dominant culture. 196 We have constitu-.
tional protections for freedom of religion and for equality, for example,
but polygamous or homosexual marriages are prohibited. We tolerate a
distinct society for Quebec but not self-determination for the First Na-
tions; we tolerate de facto and pervasive English unilingualism nation-
wide but not a law requiring unilingual French exterior signs in one
province.
sal acceptance of the dominance of the dominant culture. Critiques of these values which show that
they needn't be the way they are, that they do not reflect the values of everyone, reveal their cultural
contingency.
One way of understanding the Qu6b~cois side of the controversy over Bill 101 and unilingual
signs (see supra note 186) is as a critique of the neutrality of French-English bilingualism, an asser-
tion that such bilingualism is only desirable from the cultural perspective of the dominant culture
which is confident that bilingualism means everyone speaks English and some speak French if they
wish, and not from the cultural perspective of the Qu~b~cois who see that bilingualism so conceived
poses a direct threat to their cultural survival.
194. This entails detailed inquiries into what being labelled "different" in various ways means
now and what it has meant in the past; calling for historical analyses to uncover how the various
cultural groups have interacted (cooperated, clashed) with the dominant culture in the past and how
this has shaped the construction of particular differences today. It requires study of the impact of all
of the kinds of racism and discrimination practiced by the dominant culture against other ethnic
groups.
195. See, e.g. JEFFREY AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? (1983) (deconstructing law as a
cultural phenomenon in the history of the United States). Typologies of rights which break down the
various kinds of claims which can be asserted before the courts assist in identifying the way the
dominant culture perceives the cultures of others, which helps cultural minorities to translate their
claims into the dominant framework, as well as pointing up inadequacies in the construction of the
legal framework of cultural pluralism. See, e.g., Driedger, supra note 21; Kallen, supra note 14;
Kallen, supra note 39; Kymlicka, supra note 16; Magnet, supra note 22.
196. See Minow, supra note 1.
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The project of uncovering the dominant culture's construction of
difference means different things to different people. For those who are
mostly members of the dominant culture, this process is one of becoming
aware that you too belong to an ethnic group, have an ethnic identity (or
constituted self) that helps to shape your identity; it is becoming aware
of your group and the relationship it bears to others. For people who do
not conform to the invisible norm, this is a process of understanding 'the
other' - the group that constrains much of what you want to do - that
has power over who you are and how you can live. For the many who
conform to (or aspire to) the invisible norm in some respects but not
others, this is a process of learning to question the neutrality, universality
and desirability of a standpoint which we have internalized, a ruler
against which we tend to measure ourselves. By encouraging us to see
difference as a relationship and a function of power, 97 locating difference
enables us to understand how we each construct difference (learning dif-
ference) and requires open and honest justifications for why things are
the way they are (living difference).
The corollary of the outward inquiry (locating difference) is the
more personal quest of learning difference. This is the complex process of
unpacking cultural identity.' Learning difference requires you and your
group to look to the way you construct difference (your own and the
difference of others). It encourages you to reflect upon the extent to
which you participate in the dominant culture and to regard such partici-
pation not just as a benefit but as a responsibility, in that it makes you an
institutional architect, a rule maker, and a designer of social reality for
all. Learning difference requires you to confront your oppressiveness to
marginalized subgroups within your group and to outsiders as well as
your subjugation to others in your group and to outsiders. Learning dif-
ference means embracing the complexity of difference in each of us, re-
jecting universals (Canada, liberalism) and dichotomies (French/
English, Aboriginal/European) as descriptions, strategies or solutions,
and learning how to articulate multiplicity.
One example of how learning difference can lead to rethinking the
197. See text following note 128, supra. The difference between one group (say, Qu6bfcois
Francophones) and another (say, Franco-Manitobans or the Dene Nation or Sikhs in Vancouver) is
constructed by the ethnocentric perspective of the comparison maker, whose perceptions are re-
fracted through the prism of the dominant culture.
198. The complexity of cultural identity is well illustrated in James Clifford's discussion of an
American case in which an aboriginal group had to prove that they were currently a tribe and had
continuously existed as a tribe since the 17th Century in order to assert a land claim. See J. CLIF-
FORD, Identity in Mashpee, in THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE (1988).
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dynamics of cultural conflict is found in the position of Quebec in the
Meech Lake constitutional amendment process. Unlike the other cultural
minorities in Canada, the Qu6b~cois exercise considerable political
power. They constitute a clear majority in a province; they control its
government and its economy. The absence of Quebec's signature on the
Constitution in 1982 precipitated Meech Lake. No one seriously consid-
ered even offering the First Nations (who constitute a majority of the
population of the Northwest Territories) or any or all of the immigrant
groups an opportunity to sign. 199 The Qu~b6cois also constitute an over-
whelming majority of French Canadians in Canada, they outnumber
Francophones living outside Quebec by roughly five to one. However, it
is equally true that the Qu6b6cois are a minority. They control only one
of eleven jurisdictions in Canada, they are outnumbered (roughly one in
four Canadians is a Francophone)," ° and they have a long history of
subjugation at the hands of Anglophones. The history of Quebec has
been a history of struggle for cultural survival and, in the face of dramati-
cally declining birthrates and dire demographic predictions,2 10 it is a
struggle for survival still. The Qu6b6cois, as a group, are thus simultane-
ously a minority and a majority, a marginalized and a dominant cul-
ture.202 Failure to appreciate the complexity of their position leads the
Qu6becois to oversimplify their difference, to construct too flat a model
of their relationships with others.20 3 Quebec's exclusive focus upon its
powerlessness relative to Anglo Canada allows it to disregard the power
it does exercise. Criticisms of Meech Lake as impairing the interests of
199. Aboriginal leaders were especially bitter about recognition of Quebec as a distinct society
and with good reason: "It is as if the peoples of the First Nations never existed... We were told for
five years that governments are reluctant to entrench undefined self-government of aboriginal people
in the Constitution, yet here is an equally vague idea of distinct society, unanimously agreed to and
allowed to be left to the courts for interpretation." Chief Georges Erasmus, Native Rights, in PER-
SPECTIVES, supra note 180, at 180 (excerpts from Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Spe-
cial Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the 1987 Constitutional
Accord, Wednesday, August 19, 1987).
200. Orest Kruhlak, Constitutional Reform and Immigration, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 180,
at 201, 208.
201. Demographers have suggested that, if current trends continue, in one hundred years the
Francophone population of Quebec will have decreased from 80 percent to 12-15 percent. Leon
Dion, The Mystery of Quebec, 117(4) DAEDALUS 283, 312 (1988).
202. Status Indians may occupy a similar position: see Camille Jones, supra note 175 at 199
(suggesting that non-status Indians may be oppressed by both aboriginal and non-aboriginal
communities).
203. See, e.g., Raymond Breton, The Concepts of "Distinct Society" and "Identity" in the Meech
Lake Accord, in CONSTITuTIONAL VISIONS, supra note 6, at 3, and Chamberlin, supra note 6, who
are both critical of the oversimplification, exclusivity and oppressiveness implicit in the "two-soci-
ety" vision of Canada contained in Meech Lake.
1990]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
French Canadians outside Quebec and as eroding the rights of aboriginal
and immigrant minorities are criticisms of Quebec (and others) for con-
stitutionalizing this inaccurate and oppressive model of Canada which
recognizes only a Francophone minority and an Anglophone majority,
sweeping all others out of the picture.2" A deeper awareness of its mi-
nority/majority status would have led Quebec to seek to assure groups
over whom it exercises dominance that its quest for greater autonomy as
against Anglophone power would not be used as a weapon against the
cultural integrity of these groups.20 5 In this respect, the Qu6becois would
profit from an analysis of the feminist thought I have described, since
their position is analogous to the white mainstream feminists who, by
simplifying their model of oppression and casting themselves as a minor-
ity with respect to men, overlooked their position of dominance with re-
spect to women of Color.20 6
The two aspects of renegotiated feminism (which I have called living
difference), the reorientation of practical strategies around solidarity and
coalitions rather than on unification and assimilation, and the develop-
ment of a theory of interactive universalism to guide in the resolution of
conflict, can be usefully applied to the multicultural context. Solidarity
and coalition-building are practical strategies for working across differ-
ences on limited, concrete causes in ways which respect the uniqueness
(or difference) of each participant. They are ways to achieve common
ends without submerging particular identities; they permit groups who
depart from dominant norms to work together to effectively challenge
those norms. Such strategies are sorely needed in Canada where minority
groups have a poor record of even perceiving that they might have some-
thing in common, much less of actually working together.20 7 I should
204. See Karen Taylor-Browne, The Francophone Minority, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 181,
at 185; SCHWARTZ, supra note 188; Anthony Parel, The Meech Lake Accord and Multiculturalism,
in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 181, at 171; Kallen, supra note 39; Erasmus, supra note 199; Chamber-
ln, supra note 6. It was only because of extensive protests by aboriginal and immigrant groups that
section 16 was introduced into the text of the Accord. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
205. For example, some fear that the distinct society clause will authorize governmental policies
designed to maintain Quebec's current white, European and Christian norm. See Kruhlak, supra
note 200, at 206.
206. The negative face of Qu6b6eois ethnocentrism is revealed by insensitivity to its position of
power and privilege not only on the part of its leaders but on the part of ordinary Qu~b6cois. For
example, a casual comment by a Qu6b6eois woman effectively denied the existence of the nearly one
million French-Canadians who live outside Quebec. She corrected a friend inquiring about the differ-
ence between "French French" and "Canadian French": "There is no Canadian French," she said,
"there is only Quebec French."
207. As Evelyn Kallen has cautioned, racism is not confined to whites, and neither are preju-
dice, stereotyping or discrimination, all of which prevent ethnic groups from working with each
[Vol. 38
LESSONS OF DIFFERENCE
caution that I do not mean to advocate a happy, unified counter-hege-
monic and multiethnic force which would oust the white Anglos from
power and create a contentedly pluralistic Canada. Working together
across cultures in ways that do not flatten or deny the differences be-
tween them does not end conflict; it provides the opportunity to resolve
some specific cultural conflicts without perpetuating past patterns of
208oppression.
Cultural conflicts often appear in the judicial forum, and it is here
that renegotiated feminist theory can make an important contribution. I
suggested earlier that interactive universalism restores the possibility of
law, that is, the possibility of a law which is not unthinkingly oppressive
other. Kallen, supra note 14, at 22-26. The Qu~b~cois have emphasized that they and the An-
glophones (but not the aboriginal peoples or any immigrant groups) are the two great societies of
Canada which entitles them to special protections that should not be extended to other cultural
groups. See Lebel, supra note 51 (arguing that multiculturalism should be a private, not a public
concern). The aboriginal peoples have expressed their fear and distrust of Quebec (Erasmus, supra
note 198) and have rejected any suggestion that they share anything in common with immigrant
groups: "Ethnic groups run restaurants; we are nations of people." Sanders, Article 27 and the Ab-
original Peoples of Canada, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra note 22, at 156 (quoting Brooklyn Ri-
vera). Some immigrant groups, critical of the failure to protect multiculturalism from Quebec in the
original Meech Lake document, went further than expressing their distrust of Quebec (that is, their
fears that recognition of a distinct society would impair multicultural rights in Quebec) and sug-
gested that Quebec was no different from any of the other cultural groups. Parel, supra note 203, at
174. There is virtually no contact between immigrant and aboriginal groups. Sanders (1984), supra
note 175, at 158.
208. Some groups do work together cross-culturally, most notably the aboriginal peoples who,
before the arrival of the Europeans and then in the face of a common threat that attempted to
congeal them "into some kind of homogenized aboriginal pudding", used consensus decision-making
as a method of working together on specific issues without sacrificing the cultural integrity of any
group. Bruyere, supra note 47. An instance of non-ethnic groups successfully uniting in a common
cause is the coalition between intravenous drug users and gay men to combat AIDs. Also, the pro-
choice march on Washington D.C. on April 9, 1989 brought together groups such as Mormons,
Catholics, neo-pagans, Communists, Republicans, and lesbians in an exhilarating demonstration of
solidarity in action.
A rare example of economic cross-cultural solidarity between women on a global scale is the
Stitchting to Promote Women's World Banking (WWB) a non-profit organization registered in 1979
in the Netherlands. The idea for such an organization came from the 1975 conference in Mexico that
marked the beginning of the United Nations Decade for Women. A group of delegates created
WWB as an organization to provide women with access to economic power through the provision of
financial services, particularly credit. WWB operates on the premise of local control - and trust in
local control. The head office in New York provides information, financial support and, on request,
advice. The affiliate organizations in each country have full control over decisions about who re-
ceives credit (loans vary from under a hundred dollars to the thousands). Each WWB affiliate is only
required to adhere to a basic set of ground rules, respecting the diversity of different cultures (and
the economic needs of women within those cultures) and encouraging sharing of information, ideas
and expertise in a non-oppressive way across cultures. Michaela Walsh, Presentation at Harvard
Law School, (May 1, 1989); WWB International office, 104 East 40th Street, New York, NY 10016,
USA.
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to cultures which differ from the dominant norms in particular respects.
A legal case is a suitable context in which to apply a theory which uses
the standpoint of the concrete other to critique the standpoint of the gen-
eralized other. In a lawsuit, a particular fact situation (a concrete story
about concrete people) provides the decision maker with an opportunity
to test the adequacy of a rule generated from the perspective of a genera-
lized (dominant culture) other. Awareness gained in the process of learn-
ing difference might lead one to ask how someone culturally constituted
in one way (usually upper middle class, highly educated, conservative,
white, Anglophone, Christian, heterosexual, able-bodied, male) can pass
judgment upon someone who is not those things in a situation where the
differences between them are relevant - and who is to say when they are
or are not relevant? But in the same way that feminism avoids the solip-
sism of extreme relativism through an understanding of how the genera-
lized and the concrete other can work together, arbiters of cultural
conflicts can negotiate a tentative path between the twin pitfalls of impe-
rialism (overemphasis of the generalized other) and paralysis (overem-
phasis of the concrete other).209 A legal case can be an opportunity to
work across difference, not only for the judge who seeks to grasp some-
thing other than the dominant culture's norm,2 10 but also for counsel
who, through the institutional translation devices of the judicial forum,
209. By imperialism, I mean a judicial perspective that fails to consider the perspective of the
minority, a pernicious ethnocentrism that is imposed when the judge assumes that his or her own
(dominant culture) norms are universal, neutral and objective, that difference is a fact and not a
relationship. By paralysis, I mean a judicial stance that is overwhelmed by relativism, where the
judge feels that s/he cannot possibly presume to decide and so, by trying to abdicate responsibility
(through various technical legal devices) resolves the dispute without honestly and openly con-
fronting the competing cultural claims it presents.
210. For example, Minow and Spelman have set out five concrete criteria for decision-makers to
follow which seem to me to be particularly important in the resolution of problems of cultural
diversity:
1) The judge should try to take the perspective of all parties before the court prior to
reaching a decision.
2) The judge should try to remain open to the newness of each case, even if it resembles
previous ones, while also subjecting new understandings to scrutiny through compar-
ison with past experiences.
3) The judge should not disguise how he or she actually reached the decision, and
should explain the decision not only through post hoc justifications but also with
reference to the intuitions and reasons for selecting one principled justification over
other possible ones.
4) The judge should confront the difficulty of rejecting the arguments of a party by
trying to develop reasons that would persuade that party or explain the result in
terms that party would concede are fair.
5) The judge should acknowledge what it feels like to have power over the lives of others
in the act of judgment, and, if the judge does not experience such power, the judge
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try to articulate the minority perspective in language that the judge can
understand. 21 Seen this way, a case becomes an exciting venue for recon-
ciling cultural conflicts and for beginning to reshape some of the domi-
nant cultural norms that have oppressed minority groups for so long.212
For example, the marrying out problem will become a case for judi-
cial resolution in the near future. How the problem is conceived depends
upon the perspective of the speaker. For the bands challenging the legis-
lation, the issue is cultural autonomy. In their view, the legislation is a
blatant exercise by an oppressive state of its unilaterally asserted power
to declare who is and who is not in a band - the who (women and
children who lost status under the old rules) and the why (an old rule
that was just as much an oppressive exercise of power by the state) is not
important. The partial separation of the concept of band membership
from status in the new law, which looks so reasonable to the outsider, is
insulting to the bands because it fails to address their claim to auton-
omy.2 13 In other words, allowing the bands to have some control over
membership, while retaining the power to set the parameters (and to
change them at will), fails to cede any of the power that is the basis of the
aboriginal complaint. For the bands, the fact that this particular legisla-
tion is gender neutral is secondary. If the bands had sole jurisdiction over
membership they might have sex discriminatory membership rules or
should reflect on why, despite the actual effects of decisions he or she will make, he or
she experiences not having much power.
Minow & Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37, 50-51. See also Minow, supra note
108, at 16, 31-57, 75-95.
211. I am assuming that counsel for the cultural group(s) involved will present the case on the
basis of links they have made across the differences between the perspective of the group and the
language of the legal culture into which it must be transformed.
212. It may be objected that the judge (or other law maker), as a member of the dominant
culture (and an elite subgroup of that culture) has no reason to make the effort to work across
difference, to alter norms and practices which benefit him (and increasingly, her) to the exclusion of
others. But if the dominant culture is sincere in its rhetoric of multiculturalism, its stated commit-
ments to equality, tolerance and pluralism, then it must start renegotiating its norms through such
individuals, for those individuals have the power to change them. The Supreme Court of Canada has
begun to take some tentative steps towards the development of legal approaches congruent with the
implementation of a theory of interactive universalism and a relational (rather than an objective)
approach to difference. For example, in Andrews v. Law Society of B.C., 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (1989)
(S.C.C.) the Court was inclined towards an anti-subordination approach to equality, avoiding the
difference dilemma pitfalls in other equality theories - although anti-subordination is not without
its own pitfalls. See Marjorie Benson, Equality, Anti-Subordination, And Abortion (LL.M. thesis,
Harvard Law School, 1989).
213. It looks reasonable in the same way that bilingualism seems reasonable to a non-Qu~b6cois.
See supra note 192.
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they might not; for them, the point is that the rules would be their rules
and no one else's.
For the federal government, the underlying issue is the maintenance
of control over "Indians" asserted in section 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867. Intertwined with the issue of control is the issue of sex equal-
ity, conceptualized as reparation for a past wrong: "we had a bad rule in
the past which hurt some people so we're making up for it by reinstating
those injured." According to the government, the problem with the old
rule was that it hurt some women and their children, not that it denied
them (or anyone else) autonomy. Although the partial separation of sta-
tus from band membership hints at some unease with imposed band
membership, the state seeks to retain absolute control of the superstruc-
ture; it alone determines the parameters of aboriginal autonomy, it alone
decides what sex equality requires. The Crown takes a privilege-preserv-
ing position, building upon its unexpressed distrust of aboriginal peoples
to come up with their own vision of sex equality (analogous to the dis-
trust of Quebec expressed by outsiders during the Meech Lake contro-
versy that sex equality was part of Qu6becois distinctiveness). Whether
or not the distrust is well-founded, in a situation where the bands have
not been given a chance to demonstrate their egalitarianism, and where
the problem now being remedied was created by the government in the
first place,2 14 it seems more than a little hypocritical for the government
to be proclaiming itself as the more trustworthy guardian of sex equality.
The intervenors in the case are those who speak for the women and
their children who lost and then gained status and band membership be-
cause of federal legislation. They support sex equality and cultural auton-
omy. They are in a difficult position because the power to define what
cultural autonomy and sex equality require has been claimed by the two
groups who are dominant with respect to them and who are preoccupied
with their battle against each other.215 The intervenors will have to strug-
gle to articulate for the court what gender equality and cultural auton-
214. Prior to the uniform imposition of this rule on all status Indians through the Indian Act,
bands had differing provisions governing marriages between members and non-members. Some
bands treated both sexes equally and some did not. See Sanders (1975) supra note 175; Sanders
(1985), supra note 175, at 561.
215. The Crown represents the dominant culture, the bands are a minority with respect to the
state, but a majority with respect to the women and children who have regained status and member-
ship under the legislation, they are in the same complicated position as Quebec and white feminists.
For a description by a group of aboriginal women of their confrontations with the government and
the bands in their efforts to reform the marrying out rule, see ENOUGH Is ENOUGH; ABORIGINAL
WOMEN SPEAK OUT (as told to Janet Silman, 1987).
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omy are to a group that experiences the deprivation of those two things
together. For the arbiter of this dispute they are the people to keep in
mind when assessing the positions of the two parties because they are the
concrete others, as against the ideology-generating positions of the bands
and the Crown. A decision that does not speak to them, one that is not
grounded in an appreciation of their moral identity, is a decision which
sacrifices real people to abstractions. This is not to say that the interven-
ors should automatically win, nor that courts should always identify the
most oppressed group in a case and simply accede to its arguments. It is
only to say that such groups should no longer be passed over, as has
happened so often. Rather, they should become the litmus test by which
any new rule is judged.
The defect in the former section 12(1)(b) and in the legislation
which replaces it is that both provisions are externally imposed, violating
the principle that any group should have the power to determine its
membership. A society which truly aspires to cultural pluralism must at
least guarantee to its cultures this basic aspect of self-determination.
However, even if the marrying out rule had been created by the band
councils it would raise sex equality concerns. This is not because the con-
tent of sex equality requires that men and women always be treated the
same, it is because of what being a First Nations woman in this society
means. It means being on the margin. The plight of Jeannette Lavell,
Sandra Lovelace, and others was that they were victims of two cultures,
full members of neither.
First Nations women caught by a marrying out rule (whether in the
Indian Act or imposed by a band council) experience race discrimination
and sex discrimination together. Their exclusion from white society
(which makes their need to return to the reserve so great) is primarily
because they are Native. Their marginalization in Native society (which
allows band councils to force them off the reserves) is primarily because
they are women.216 In an ideal pluralist state, it is conceivable that the
women and men of a particular culture might agree that a gender-specific
endogamy rule was part of their culture. But in Canada, the power to
define Native culture is often held by male-dominated band councils. Na-
tive peoples, over many years, have internalized the oppressive rules im-
posed by the dominant culture and the hierarchy of gender and culture
difference is entrenched and pervasive. In this context, the marrying out
rule significantly exacerbates oppression of First Nations women. Any
216. Id. at 12-14.
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claim advanced by the bands in support of the rule must be balanced
against these considerations.'
17
The task in this case is to determine the appropriate role for the
court, itself an institution of the dominant culture, in alleviating the in-
tervenor's oppression, respecting the intervenor's and the band's cultural
integrity, and acknowledging the dominant culture's responsibility in cre-
ating, maintaining and resolving the dispute. Clearly, approaching the
case as I have suggested does not yield a simple uncontroversial outcome.
It does establish, however, that absolutist and ethnocentric perceptions of
what sex equality and cultural autonomy mean must give way to more
qualified, tentative formulations. The dominant culture should be re-
quired to cede some of its power of definition and to accept some fissures
in its hegemony over aboriginal peoples. In return for increased auton-
omy, however, the bands should be required to give tangible assurance to
the intervenors, the internal minority, that their concerns will be ad-
dressed, their victimization reduced. Thus, greater cultural autonomy
may come at the price of adherence to externally-imposed conditions
which have been formulated with the concrete other in mind. The chal-
lenge for the judge is to craft such a solution, which is interactive univer-
salism in action: a partial and unstable and small step, but still a step,
toward the elusive and ever-changing utopian vision of cultural diversity.
V. CONCLUSION
My purpose in this Article has been to persuade people who are
interested in problems of cultural diversity to study feminist theory. The
central message that feminist theory has to share is that the way to begin
to resolve issues of difference without oppressing those who are labelled
different is to notice them. The challenge is not to see our own reflections
in their eyes, or to imagine what we would want if we were they, but
actually to pay attention to what they are saying about who they are. If
this is to be done, quests for essences and identity, for simple, universal
rules, for tidy labels and determinate definitions (of equality or feminism
or Canada) grounded in a fixed and finite (constitutional) set of ideals
217. In suggesting that what sex equality means is not a cross-cultural constant yet maintaining
that the band councils' claim of what the culture requires is not immune from scrutiny, I may seem
inconsistent. Implying, as I do, that a rule which effectively disadvantages women when advocated
by a group in whose management and direction women do not fully participate is suspect on sex
equality grounds, suggests that I consider a minimum procedural condition of participation to be a
cross-cultural sex equality constant. In the face of the evidence that sexism permeates all cultures,
and that there are always disputes within a culture about what that culture is or should become, I
believe that some such condition is necessary for a workable (feminist) pluralist state.
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must be relinquished. But this does not mean relinquishing hope. A femi-
nist version of a pluralist society is a working and fluid utopia, where
individuals and groups seek to develop their own ethnocentric identities
while respecting the ethnocentric identities of others, where limited and
partial strategies for working together in the context of common causes
replace stifling uniformity, and where a multiplicity of imaginative vi-
sions supplants the dominant ideology. These are the lessons that differ-
ence has to teach.

